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Abstract
This article identifies a previously-ignored pattern of Supreme Court decisions 
that privilege one competing constitutional value, either speech or equality, and 
subordinate the other—with little or no reasoning explaining its choice. In adjudicating 
such cases, including two cases decided last term, the Supreme Court has steadfastly 
treated these disputes as either a basic equality case or a simple speech case.  This 
dichotomy is a problem because once the Court places a case within either a speech or 
equality paradigm, it is constrained by certain rigid analytical presumptions.  These 
presumptions threaten to stunt the analysis and to deprive the Court of the flexibility 
necessary to reconcile the competing constitutional commitments.  Consequently, a string 
of Supreme Court cases have privileged First Amendment interests of speech or 
association over equality interests.  At times, the Court has not even recognized the 
equality dimensions of these cases in part because the equality interests were embedded 
in state antidiscrimination laws.  
Analyzing a number of key cases including the Boy Scouts and burning cross 
cases, I show that, contrary to the Court’s reductive assumptions, these cases are 
fundamentally about speech and equality.  Rather than artificially force a case into a 
speech or equality box, my approach would fuse speech and equality doctrine.  After 
setting forth a general framework to speech-equality intersections, this Article 
reconstructs the analysis of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
to show how a more balanced approach would produce a finer-grained analysis reflective 
of a holistic conception of the Constitution.  
I. Introduction
II. Identifying the Supreme Court’s Lopsided Approach to Equality-Speech 
Intersections
III. The Proportionate Approach to Speech-Equality Intersections
IV. The Supreme Court’s Tendency to Privilege Speech over Equality
V. Conclusion
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2I. Introduction
Clashes between speech and equality interests have notoriously fractured “old 
‘liberal’ alliances.”1  The majority of academic literature in this area has focused on hate 
speech regulation,2 and the issue has polarized, pushing most discourse to the fringes.3
The tendency has been either to slight the Constitution’s commitment to free speech or to 
neglect its dedication to equality.  Civil libertarians and scholars aligned with them 
sometimes have displayed insensitivity to the unique injuries inflicted by hate speech, 
overlooked the special status of equality in the Constitution and put forth simplistic and 
paternalistic arguments.4  In upholding the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment 
1
 Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22, 44 (1992).  
2 See Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum: Toward Anti-Orthodoxy and 
Inclusion, 61 OHIO ST. L. J. 1671, 1672, 1713 (2000).  Another important focus of equality-speech 
literature has been pornography regulation.  See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (1996); 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words (1993); Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: 
Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 24-28 (1985).  As the 
Supreme Court has not addressed the clash between speech and equality interests in the 
pornography context—it summarily affirmed the Hudnut case without an opinion, see American 
Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)—
this article does not explore the regulation of pornography.
3
 As John Powell adroitly explains, scholars (and judges) tend to view such conflicts through the 
prism of an individual worldview favoring either speech or equality.  The speech and equality 
worldviews are “different and distinct narratives” which are difficult to surmount in part because 
people rarely recognize that they are starting from a place that privileges one value or the other.  
John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85 KY. L.J. 9, 11 
(1997).  Much of the literature is tainted by this problem, and “there is seldom a serious effort to 
consider claims from anything other than the favored framework.”  Id. at 13.  
4
 As Robert Post explains, 
In recent years there has been an unfortunate tendency, by no means limited to the 
controversy surrounding racist speech, to avoid this difficult work by relying instead on 
formulaic invocations of First Amendment “interests” which can be captured in such 
conclusory labels as “individual self-fulfillment,” “truth,” “democracy,” and so forth.  
These formulas cast an illusion of stability and order over First Amendment 
jurisprudence, an illusion that can turn dangerous when it substitutes for serious 
engagement with the question of why we really care about protecting freedom of 
expression.
Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
267, 278 (1991) [hereinafter Post, Racist Speech].  Although Post refers only to proponents of hate 
speech laws, the same applies, in my view, to their civil libertarian opponents.  Techniques used 
by civil libertarians include assigning their opponents the burden and demanding that they may 
3“often seems to drop out of the analysis . . . .[or] is mentioned only in passing” by these 
scholars.5  “Like people with spectacles who often forget they are wearing them, [they] 
read the Bill of Rights through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment without realizing 
how powerfully that lens has refracted what they see.”6  Sweeping proclamations often 
made about the First Amendment suggest that it is “the Constitution’s most majestic 
guarantee.”7  But such a view tends implicitly to subordinate all other provisions, 
including those that represent seminal “constitutional moments,”8 such as the Fourteenth 
Amendment.9  In fetishizing the First Amendment and elevating it above the very 
amendment that makes it applicable to the states, some critics10 of hate crime laws fail to 
regulate only if they can avoid any line-drawing problems and slippery slope concerns, even 
though such problems and concerns permeate the law.  See Powell, supra note 3, at 15-24.  Other 
common techniques include the “take the bitter with the sweet” argument, which reminds people 
of color of the civil rights-inflected free speech precedent which benefited them, and trite 
invocation of First Amendment axioms such as the marketplace of ideas.  For good examples of 
these arguments, see Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?
1990 DUKE L. J. 484 (1990).  Even deeply reflective works at times tend to privilege implicitly 
one value over the other.  See, e.g., Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 278 (using the burden-
shifting argument in imparting hate speech regulators with the “formidable task” of “carv[ing] out 
a new exception to the . . . first amendment”).  With respect to the frequently touted marketplace 
of ideas, such arguments often fail to understand that “[a]ssaultive racial speech . . . . is 
experienced as a blow, not a proffered idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely that dialogue 
will follow.  Racial insults are undeserving of first amendment protection because the perpetrator’s 
intention is not to discover truth or initiate dialogue but to injure the victim.”  Charles R. 
Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 
431, 452 (1990).  As discussed further below, whether hateful language is viewed as merely 
offensive or as a verbal assault often hinges on whether the individual is an insider or an outsider.
5
 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1136 (1991) 
[hereinafter Amar, The Bill of Rights].
6 Id. at 1137.  
7 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785 (1988); see also Thomas 
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (referring to the “preferred place given in our scheme to the 
great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment”); Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (describing free speech as “the indispensable condition, of 
nearly every other form of freedom”).
8
 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 
1022 (1984).
9 See Powell, supra note 3, at 21 (“In our legal history, and even today, there is often the 
assumption that the First Amendment is the essential amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment 
is the unessential or epiphenomenal amendment.”).
4recognize that First Amendment analysis inevitably entails balancing of interests,11 and 
often accommodates governmental interests that are both less compelling than equality 
and that lack equality’s firm footing in the Constitution’s text.  State interests in 
regulating sexual morality or protecting individual reputation and privacy, for instance, 
are thought to be unobjectionable,12 yet governmental attempts to ensure equality are 
somehow seen as an illegitimate “special” exception to the First Amendment.13
10 See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN’T SAY THAT: THE GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL 
LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 12-13 (2003); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech 
and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 223, 235 (1996).  These 
scholars tend to downplay the extent to which current First Amendment doctrine involves 
balancing of competing interests, including interests that are not constitutional values.
11 See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-1, at 792 (“The ‘balancers’ are right in concluding that it is 
impossible to escape the task of weighing the competing interests . . . .”); see also Mari J. 
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2320, 2356 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Victim’s Story] (“[A]bsolute protection of expression 
would render unconstitutional ‘all of contract law, most of antitrust law, and much of criminal 
law.’  The need to distinguish protected from unprotected speech is inevitable.”) (quoting 
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265, 270 (1981)).
[T]he First Amendment is not absolute; there are numerous restrictions of ‘free’ speech 
which have been found constitutional.  For instance, bribes, threats or ‘intimidation’, 
fighting words, defamation, criminal solicitation, misleading commercial speech, 
advertisement of illegal activities, television and radio advertisements for cigarettes, 
advocating the violent overthrow of the government if lawless action is imminent, 
obscenity, profane and indecent language, child pornography, attorneys’ public speech 
during trials, federally-funded physicians informing clients about the abortion option, and 
certain types of labor speech are all subjected to some form of government regulation.  
All of these listed ‘exceptions’ are based upon the content of the speech.
Morrison Torrey, Thoughts About Why the First Amendment Operates to Stifle the Freedom and 
Equality of a Subordinated Majority, 21 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 25, 28 (1999).  But see Hugo 
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874 (1960); Jed Rubenfeld, The First 
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 768, 776 (2001) (attempting to explain First 
Amendment doctrine by reference to an absolute bar on laws whose purpose is to punish speech).
12 Cf. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 145 (1982) (noting instances where law protects 
injuries less substantial than racial equality); Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 273-74 (noting 
analogy between defamation/invasion of privacy torts and hate speech).  
13 See, e.g., Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 278 (“It is a formidable task to carve out a new 
exception to the general protection of speech afforded by the armor of first amendment doctrine.”).  
I find it curious that scholars often characterize hate speech regulation as dependent on a “new” 
exception to the First Amendment doctrine, given that Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942), and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding statute proscribing group 
libel), predate the cornerstones of the now-dominant wave of expansive First Amendment 
protection.  See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v.Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969) (per curiam); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  These latter cases of 
course undermined Chaplinsky and Beauharnais (at least to some extent), but the point is that, as 
5On the other hand, in advocating for equality, critical race scholars often have 
failed sufficiently to respect the First Amendment and the concomitant need to strike a 
balance between the First and the Fourteenth Amendments.  Their use of First 
Amendment theory and Supreme Court precedent is sometimes so loose and malleable 
that an “antisubordination interpretation of the First Amendment”14 itself tends to 
subordinate the First Amendment.15
the laws that the Court approved in Beauharnais and Chaplinsky illustrate, hate speech regulation 
is hardly contingent on a new exception.  Some critical race scholars have similarly erred, in my 
view, in urging a new exception for hate speech.  See, e.g., Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, 
at 2357 (“Racist speech is best treated as a sui generis category.”).  This characterization 
unwittingly tacitly supports those who would assign the burden to proponents of hate speech 
regulation and overlooks that hate speech should be understood as a subset of an extant category 
of unprotected speech, fighting words.
14
 Mari J. Matsuda & Charles Lawrence III, Epilogue: Burning Crosses and the R.A.V. Case, in
Mari J. Matsuda, Charles Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, 
Words that Wound 136 (1993).
15
 For instance, some critical race scholars endorse international efforts to ban most, if not all, 
racist expression, not just face-to-face “fighting words.”  See, e.g., Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra
note 11, at 2341 (relying on Article 4 of the International Convention on Elimination of all Forms 
of Racial Discrimination which criminalizes “all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority 
or hatred”) (emphasis added).  Despite this sweeping language, Professor Matsuda states: “All 
ideas about differences between races are not banned [under the international consensus].  The 
definitive elements are discrimination, connection to violence, and messages of inferiority, hatred 
or persecution.” Id. at 2348.  This is a paradigmatic example of a supposed stopping point that 
lacks discernable content.  Matsuda’s suggestion that “a belief in intellectual differences between 
the races,” id., could not be interpreted to contain an element of “discrimination,” a “connection to 
violence” or a “message[] of inferiority” strains credulity. Id.  Such efforts to “control racism,” id.
at 2345, rather than merely the most virulent racial epithets, would basically gut the First 
Amendment.  The failure to see that such proposals strike at the heart of the First Amendment 
betrays the lopsided disposition of such scholars.  See id. at 2346 (arguing that U.S. resistance to 
Article 4 “represents an extreme commitment to the first amendment at the expense of 
antidiscrimination goals”).  Another aspect of this lopsided approach is the castigation of white 
supremacist speech in the most forceful terms in contrast to the failure to see the harm caused by 
people of color who attack whites.  See id. at 2361-362 (concluding that speech by a “white-hating 
nationalist” should be immune because it denotes “a victim’s struggle for self-identity in response 
to racism”).  For other arguments privileging equality over speech, see Delgado, supra note 12, at 
179-80 (arguing that the First Amendment would permit a tort action based on mere insult, such as 
calling a black male a “boy,” without requiring a showing of threat or intimidation); Powell, supra
note 3, at 29-30 (discussing Charles Lawrence’s scholarship) (“[Lawrence] argues that it is not 
only appropriate to balance free speech and equality, but also that equality must prevail.”); Torrey, 
supra note 11, at 34 (asserting that in balancing the First Amendment against the Fourteenth, 
“clearly the latter should prevail”).  Although I am critical of scholars such as Professor Matsuda, I 
do not mean to detract from their important contributions to hate speech discourse.  Indeed, in 
various respects, I rely on her seminal insights.  
6In this article, I focus on how the Supreme Court has mistreated equality-speech 
intersections, although I do so against the background of the voluminous scholarly 
literature on hate speech.  The Supreme Court’s analysis in key freedom of association
and hate speech cases has been at least as lopsided as the scholarly discussion.  As I 
demonstrate in the next section, there is a general trend in which the Court has treated 
disputes that implicate complex speech-equality intersections as simple speech cases.  
Conversely, at other times, the Court has reduced an intricate speech-equality intersection 
to a basic equality case.  Rather than seeking a proportionate balance between these two 
constitutional imperatives, the Court has often either overlooked one interest entirely or 
addressed that countervailing interest in a curt, dismissive fashion.  In a few keys cases, 
which I examine in detail below, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul16 and Boy Scouts of America 
v. Dale,17 the Court essentially sided with the civil libertarian camp, in that it privileged 
speech over equality.  I demonstrate how the Court neglected the countervailing equality 
interests in each of these cases.  I show that the Court has not embraced its obligation to 
interpret the Constitution as a whole and construe its provisions with sufficient flexibly 
so that the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment can coexist harmoniously.  
This article attempts to create a greater awareness of this unfortunate trend and 
begin to articulate a method that affords respect to both constitutional interests, 
reconciling the First Amendment with “the massive transformation brought about by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”18  The Court’s recent, and in various respects surprising, 
decision in Virginia v. Black, as well as Justice Thomas’ striking statement at oral 
16
 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
17
 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
18
 Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 5, at 1152; see also Cass Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 821 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste] (“[T]he Equal 
7argument, provides a fresh and rich opportunity to revisit the issue of hate speech and, 
importantly, to situate it within a broader analysis of equality-speech conflicts.  The 
proportionate approach to speech-equality intersections, which I sketch out below, 
addresses important concerns beyond the narrow issue of hate speech.  It offers guidance 
to courts negotiating the thicket of intersectionalities in general, including the various 
speech-equality intersections discussed herein.
In Part II, I discuss as background a number of areas of the law in which speech 
and equality have intersected, and I identify the Court’s pattern in which one 
constitutional value is privileged and the other subordinated with little or no reasoning 
explaining that choice.  In Part III, I articulate an alternative to the Court’s lopsided 
approach to equality-speech intersections.  Drawing on the better insights from the 
critical race and civil libertarians literature, as well as the few scholars who have 
attempted to chart a middle course,19 I develop a proportionate approach to equality-
speech conflicts.  
The proportionate approach requires paying close attention to context and history, 
being cognizant of unconscious tendencies to privilege one value over the other and 
unpacking interests that the Court has slighted.  Under this approach, one key conclusion, 
I argue, is that state equality-based laws—which in advancing equality sometimes 
interfere with speech interests—should generally be understood as first cousins to Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which expressly grants Congress the power to enforce 
the Constitution’s commitment to equality.  Although state equality-based laws do not 
Protection Clause was originally conceived as an effort to counteract the disproportionate 
subjection of black people to private and public violence.”).
19 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, 
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L. J.
2411, 2449 (1997); Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 873 (1993); Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4. 
8have the explicit textual imprimatur of Section 5, such laws complement Section 5 and 
are integral to a full effectuation of the equality commitment embodied in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  A proportionate, evenhanded approach to resolving equality-speech 
disputes would treat such laws with care and sensitivity, paying close attention to context 
and history, instead of brusquely overriding state laws whenever they are said to impede 
speech interests.  
Part IV then fleshes out the differences between the lopsided and proportionate 
approaches by critiquing two important equality-speech cases, Boy Scouts and R.A.V.  I 
trace how a number of the Court’s arguments in these cases overlooked equal protection 
considerations and demonstrate how the cases would be analyzed under the proportionate 
approach.  In some cases, a proportionate approach would make a critical difference—
R.A.V., for instance, would come out differently, in my view.  In other instances, such as 
the Boy Scouts case, the outcome may not be as clear-cut, given factual aspects that the 
Court chose not to explore.20  At a minimum, however, if the Court had employed the 
proportionate approach, it would have produced reasoning more credible than that in Boy 
Scouts.  The Boys Scouts majority opinion not only misunderstands gay people but also 
does violence to antidiscrimination law.  Contrary to precedent, it essentially transforms 
the right to free association into a “free pass out of antidiscrimination laws.”21  This 
section concludes by looking at Virginia v. Black, the recent case concerning the 
regulation of cross burning.  Black suggests a fundamental shift in the Court’s approach 
to equality-speech intersections and moves the Court closer to the proportionate 
approach.  Part V provides a conclusion. 
20 See infra Part IV.
21 Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 688 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9II. Identifying the Supreme Court’s Lopsided Approach to Equality-Speech 
Intersections
Despite the overwhelming scholarly focus on hate speech, potential conflict 
between equality and speech exists in various other areas of the law, including the 
regulation of employment and places of public accommodation.  Although speech and 
equality clashes may be most important when someone’s job and livelihood is at stake, 
the Court has barely recognized the strong conflict that exists.  Most notably, although it 
has repeatedly applied and enforced sexual harassment law,22 it has not fully explained 
how laws that monitor the sexual content of speech can coexist with the First 
Amendment.  Although the R.A.V. decision suggested, with minimal analysis, that sexual 
harassment law is consistent with the First Amendment,23 Justice Thomas subsequently 
argued that the very same analysis called into question sexual harassment law.24  Justice 
Thomas’ argument shows that the Court’s failure to engage the complex relationship 
between equality and speech implicated by sexual harassment laws has cast a pall over 
the constitutionality of such laws.
In a Title VII case that did not involve a sexual harassment claim, Hishon v. King 
& Spalding,25 a prominent corporate law firm asserted that the First Amendment 
protected its decision to deny a female attorney membership as a firm partner in violation 
of Title VII.26  The Court rejected this argument, summarily announcing that “[t]here is 
no constitutional right . . . to discriminate.”27  Although the Court correctly concluded 
22 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
23 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 409-10 (1992).
24 See Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Aguilar, 529 U.S. 1138 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25
 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
26 See id. at 78.
27 Id.
10
that admitting a woman partner would not impair the firm’s ability to express any 
message,28 this finding did not address the freedom of association component of the 
firm’s argument.  In the end, the Court’s dismissive treatment of the First Amendment 
argument—a full three sentences—denied the force of the argument29 and erroneously 
suggested that the tension between equality and speech was entirely illusory.  
Just as cursory was the Court’s analysis in an education case Runyon v. 
McCrary,30 which dealt with discriminatory private schools.  Holding that 42 U.S.C. § 
1981 bars private racial discrimination in contracting, the Court applied the statute to 
private schools that excluded students on the basis of race.31  This construction of the 
statute, the Court announced, did not violate the First Amendment.32  The Court claimed 
to assume that “parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to 
educational institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and 
that the children have an equal right to attend such institutions.”33  Nonetheless, it 
endorsed the lower court’s finding that “‘there is no showing that discontinuance of (the) 
discriminatory admission practices would inhibit in any way the teaching in these schools 
of any ideas or dogma.’”34  Simply announcing that “‘the Constitution places no value on 
discrimination . . . it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections,’”35
28 See id.
29
 Just two terms later, the Court stated: “There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the 
internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept 
members it does not desire.”  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
30 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
31 See id. at 172; see also Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that denial 
of charitable tax deduction to religious college that practiced racial discrimination did not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause).  
32 See id. at 176.  
33 Id.
34 Id. (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (1975)) (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 161 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
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the Court chose to ignore the difficult cases raised by a construction of Section 1981 that 
could, say, bar a family from considering race in choosing a live-in babysitter, thereby 
intruding on considerable associational interests.36
The Court thus failed candidly to acknowledge that there was an impingement on 
the schools’ speech interest (its desire to teach segregation), even though the state 
imposed the burden indirectly through mandating the admission of students of color 
rather than directly dictating curriculum.  Of course, there was a strong argument that the 
equality interest should have trumped in the end, in light of Brown v. Board of 
Education’s affirmation of the importance of education and the school’s general lack of 
selectivity and quasi-public nature.37  But the Court’s cursory analysis did not bother to 
reach this far.  Instead, it rested upon the claim that forcing schools to admit children of 
color would not make it more difficult for them to “promote the belief that racial 
segregation is desirable,”38 which is utterly implausible.  It is hard to imagine that the 
Court actually expected white teachers to promote the inferiority of black children with 
those very children sitting right in front of them, thereby directly inflicting the stigmatic 
injury at the heart of Brown.
Just last Term, the Court, in another education case, addressed a speech-equality 
intersection in upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s race-conscious 
admissions policy.39  The Court held that in light of a university’s First Amendment 
36 See id. at 187-88 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 212 (White, J., dissenting) (“As the associational 
or contractual relationships become more private, the pressures to hold s[ection] 1981 inapplicable to them 
will increase.”).  Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (“[T]he formation and preservation of 
certain kinds of highly personal relationships [enjoy] a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified 
interference by the State.”).
37 Cf. 427 U.S. at 173 n.10.
38 Id. at 176.
39 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2343 (2003).
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interest in academic freedom, law schools have a compelling interest in obtaining a 
diverse student body.40  The Court approved the University of Michigan Law School’s 
flexible, individualized admissions process, which considers race as one of many factors, 
but in a companion case, the Court invalidated a rigid, points-based system used by the 
university’s undergraduate college.41  In this context, the Court found that the speech and 
equality interests were complementary, not in conflict: the First Amendment interest of 
academic freedom enabled the law school to decide to consider race in furtherance of an 
admissions policy seeking educational diversity.42  Again, the Court’s approach was 
somewhat lopsided; it told us plenty about equality, but precious little about speech, even 
though the speech interest may explain the Court’s deference to the university, an integral 
aspect of the Court’s holding.  The Grutter Court’s First Amendment analysis came off as 
a hazy afterthought.  It did not explain how the scattered precedent suggestive of a First 
Amendment academic freedom interest applied to the case at hand, given the largely 
inapposite facts of the prior cases.43  Nor did it make any attempt to sketch the metes and 
bounds of this new constitutional interest.  As Justice Thomas aptly demonstrated,44 this 
new interest in academic freedom could be used to the detriment of people of color unless 
it is some sort of one-way “ratchet” that can help, but not hurt, racial minorities.45
Further, could an institution use its First Amendment right to promote diversity within its 
40 See id. at 2338-2342.
41 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411(2003).
42 See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2340.
43 See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
44 See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2356-57 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
45 Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (interpreting Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to permit Congress to enforce and define the equal protection guarantee, 
but not to “dilute” it).
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walls to justify hate speech regulation?46 Grutter inadvertently raises this question but 
provides remarkably little insight on speech-equality intersections.47
Finally, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 
which the Court treated as a simple affirmative action case, the Court adopted a rationale 
arguably at odds with the Court’s First Amendment doctrine.  The FCC justified its 
policies giving preferential treatment to people of color in the acquiring of broadcast 
media licenses by arguing that the policies would create more diverse content, a public 
benefit.48  The Court endorsed the value of broadcast diversity and found that the FCC 
policies were suitably tailored to achieve this goal.49  In so doing, the Court failed to 
consider that a governmental preference for particular speakers50 or particular diverse 
content could be understood as content-based regulation.51  Content-based regulation, the 
Court has said on numerous occasions, presumptively violates the First Amendment.52
46 Cf. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 276-77 (discussing policy of Mount Holyoke College, 
which “seeks to inculcate the value of diversity, which it views as plainly inconsistent with racist 
expression”).  Under this scenario, the posited First Amendment interest would threaten to turn the 
Amendment upon itself, using academic freedom potentially to undermine core free speech values.  
47
 Additionally, Grutter adds another layer of contradiction to this already-muddled area of the law in that 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion appears to repudiate the anti-diversity argument she made in dissent in 
Metro Broadcasting.  See 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled in part by, Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200 (1995) (“The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a 
compelling interest.”); id. at 617 (decrying the government’s “equating race with [particular] thoughts and 
behavior” as “resting . . . on stereotyping” ).  It at least requires some explanation as to why diversity is a 
compelling interest and relying on race to foster diversity is permissible in one First Amendment context 
(academic freedom) but not another (broadcasting).
48 See id. at 568.
49 See id. at 567-69.
50 See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1984); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 
633-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“A ban on specific 
group voices on public affairs violates the most basic guarantee of the First Amendment—that 
citizens, not the government, control the content of public discussion.”).
51
 Justice O’Connor tentatively raised this argument.  See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 617 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (“The FCC’s extension of the asserted interest in diversity of views in these cases presents, at 
the very least, an unsettled First Amendment issue. . . . [T]he Court has never upheld a broadcasting 
measure designed to amplify a distinct set of views or the views of a particular class of speakers.”).
52 See infra note 180 and accompanying text.  Equality and the right to associate have also 
intersected in the voting context.  See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-66 (1944) (holding 
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The aforementioned cases, in particular Runyon, demonstrate how the Court’s 
failure fully to resolve speech-equality intersections and firmly justify its conclusions 
have made the law in this area fragile and somewhat contradictory.  Accordingly, it was 
easy for the Boy Scouts Court to rule against an excluded minority without even citing 
and distinguishing Runyon.  The Runyon Court refused to see the impairment of the 
private school’s expressive interest in inculcating the value of segregation, whereas as 
discussed more fully below, the Boy Scouts Court bent over backwards to defer to the 
Boy Scouts’ effort to preserve its professed anti-homosexuality agenda.  
III. The Proportionate Approach to Speech-Equality Intersections
Unlike the Supreme Court’s lopsided analysis in the aforementioned cases, the 
proportionate approach provides a holistic framework that strives to harmonize diverse
components of the Constitution and consistently recognize and effectuate the 
commitments underlying each provision.  In contrast to the Court’s lopsided, inadvertent 
approach to equality-speech intersections, the proportionate approach requires being 
cognizant of unconscious tendencies to privilege one constitutional commitment over 
another.  It would preclude the adjudication of a case like R.A.V. without even 
considering the Court’s equal protection case law.  That is, it would not permit treating a 
case implicating a speech-equality intersection as a simple speech case.  As I will 
demonstrate below, the Court, in cases like R.A.V., failed to recognize that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, inasmuch as it was ratified after the First Amendment, may 
require different outcomes and applications of general speech principles when a law 
that political parties, which asserted that they were private associations, were state actors and thus 
their racial discrimination violated the Fifteenth Amendment); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial 
Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV.
1209 (2003). 
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addresses discrimination against groups such as people of color and women.53  Equal 
protection law generally permits government to redress harm based on its own unequal 
treatment of suspect or quasi-suspect classes, including those discriminated against based 
on race, gender and religion.  Extrapolating from this basic equal protection principle, 
Justice Brennan in Roberts v. United States Jaycees premised the Court’s holding that the 
state could require the Jaycees to admit women members on the “special harms distinct 
from their communicative impact” caused by private “invidious discrimination.”54
In R.A.V., where the Court considered whether the City of St. Paul, Minnesota 
could ban cross burning, the Court flipped Justice Brennan’s conclusion.  The special 
nature of discrimination against people of color, women and religious minorities—the 
very basis for treating them as suspect or quasi-suspect classes under the Equal Protection 
Clause—proved that the hate speech ordinance was aimed at a “distinctive idea,”55 which 
made the ordinance especially vulnerable from a First Amendment perspective.  In 
setting the First and Fourteenth Amendments at cross-purposes, the R.A.V. Court not 
only disregarded Roberts, but it neglected its obligation to harmonize the various parts of 
the Constitution.  In contrast, the proportionate approach aims to afford equivalent 
respect and legitimacy to each of the competing constitutional provisions.  A critical goal 
53 Compare with Abner Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2000) 
(arguing that the First Amendment should be interpreted to permit government considerable 
flexibility in expressing government viewpoints and subsidizing expression, except that the 
government may not “further ghettoiz[e] a discrete and insular minority”).  
54
 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (emphasis added).   
55 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992).  The Virginia Supreme Court, applying R.A.V., 
performed a similar feat: 
[C]onsidering the historical and current context of cross burning, and 
the statute’s reliance on such context for the provision of an inference 
of intent to intimidate from the mere act of burning a cross, it is clear 
that the Commonwealth’s interest in enacting the cross burning statute 
is related to the suppression of free expression as well.
Black v. Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 738, 775 (Va. 2001).  Remarkably, the “virulent” nature of the burning cross 
provided the basis for its constitutional protection. Id.
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of this careful balancing is to preserve the pluralism and diversity of society, a First 
Amendment and equality interest.  To demonstrate, consider whether a state university 
should permit a law student group such as BLSA to exist and restrict membership to 
African-Americans.  An unequivocal (and formal) application of equality principles 
would require nondiscrimination even if the practical effect were to dilute the 
organization’s ability to promote solely the interests of African-American law students.  
Diluting or banning organizations such as BLSA, however, also diminishes a First 
Amendment interest in that it reduces the variety among organizations in a society that 
values pluralism and the attendant diversity of group expression.  Consequently, equality 
and speech interests both ask us to strike a balance.
Second, the proportionate approach demands careful attention to context 
and history.  Brown v. Board of Education is a cornerstone of a context-specific 
approach in that there the Court refused to rely on the deceptive formal equality of 
the law before it, as it had in Plessy v. Ferguson.56  Even though the law restricted 
whites and blacks from interacting, the Court looked to the social meaning of the 
law and saw its racially stigmatizing purpose and effect.  Similarly, the 
proportionate approach eschews resting on abstract generalizations or basic 
principles.  It delves deeper, requiring a close look at the asserted interests on 
each side of the balance to understand which interest is weightier given the facts 
of the particular situation.57  Further, the gravity of the individual interests should 
56
 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57
 As Justice Breyer stated in explaining his approach in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 
528 U.S. 377 (2000):
[W]here a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally 
protected interests in complex ways—the Court has closely scrutinized 
the statute’s impact on those interests, but refrained from employing a 
simple test that effectively presumes unconstitutionality.  Rather, it has 
balanced interests.  And in practice that has meant asking whether the 
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be measured in part by contemplating how the law is felt by the particular people 
before the court (like the African-American children in Brown).  For Supreme 
Court Justices, who tend to be isolated in a world of abstractions, “[t]his shift in 
perspective requires studying the actual experiences of those groups that have 
suffered oppression and heeding the voice of that experience rather than 
considering this viewpoint in the abstract.”58
For instance, in the Boy Scouts case, this approach would require a close look at 
the impact of the exclusion on James Dale, the homosexual Scout leader ejected from the 
Scouts after officials learned of his sexual orientation.  But the proportionate approach 
does not look only to the “bottom.”59  The Boy Scouts opinion is striking in its utter 
failure to consider the impact of the exclusion on Dale, who sued to retain his 
membership after ten years of loyal service to the Boy Scouts.  On the other side of the 
balance, the court must consider how forbidding the Boy Scouts to exclude openly gay 
people would impact the organization and its central goals.  
Third, as Justice Breyer has cogently pointed out in his First Amendment 
opinions,60 when there are competing constitutional interests, each should be examined 
carefully and thoughtfully, but a court should not subject one interest to a strict standard, 
which essentially puts a thumb on the scale.  “[S]trict scrutiny—with its strong 
statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion to 
the statute’s salutary effects upon the others. . . .
Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
58 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1779 n.300 (1993).  Judges 
should be careful not to “slight the heterogeneity of people of color” and should understand that there is no 
single “Black experience,” for example.  Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1784 (1989).
59
 Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2322; see also Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1283 (2002) (discussing various methodological questions raised by looking to the 
bottom).
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presumption against constitutionality—is normally out of place where, as here, important 
competing constitutional interests are implicated.”61 Accordingly, I argue, like Justice 
Breyer, for applying intermediate scrutiny in such situations.  However, Justice Stevens’ 
dissent in Boy Scouts (which Justice Breyer joined) veered dangerously close to applying 
strict scrutiny to the asserted First Amendment interest.  His extensive evidentiary 
demands, detailed below, are inconsistent with a proportionate approach.  In the end, 
even under the proportionate approach, Boy Scouts may be a close case.  For purposes of 
this inquiry, more important than the ultimate outcome is the realization that neither the 
dissent’s rigorous analysis nor the majority’s toothless standard constitutes a sufficiently 
nuanced approach.
Finally, under the proportionate approach, state antidiscrimination laws should be 
understood as first cousins of laws enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which expressly grants Congress the power to enforce the Constitution’s 
commitment to equality.62 State equality-based laws “reflect[] the State’s strong 
historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access 
to publicly available goods and services.”63   It is true that the Fourteenth Amendment 
specifically declares that Congress has enforcement power, but does not mention the 
states.  But neither is the “right of association,” which has formed a basis for many 
Supreme Court precedents (including Boy Scouts), mentioned in the text of the First 
60 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 537 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring); Nixon, 528 
U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
61 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring).
62 Compare with Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 5, at 1202 (arguing that under a holistic 
interpretation of the Constitution, the Nineteenth Amendment, although textually referring only to 
voting, should be read to invalidate gender discrimination with respect to political rights, such as 
jury service).  
63 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).
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Amendment; it is “derived by implication” from textual rights.64  Nor is the right to equal 
protection against the federal government found anywhere in the constitutional text, but 
that has not stopped the Court from importing the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality 
guarantee into the Fifth.65  Such interpretive moves, which are not at all uncommon, rest 
on structural considerations that transcend the details of particular textual provisions 
viewed in isolation.
Moreover, although the point is apparently lost on the current Supreme Court 
majority, which has arrogated for itself the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
and saddled Congress with a cramped interpretation of the Section 5 power,66 the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment preferred legislative enforcement as the primary means of 
protecting equality.67  State power, indeed under some circumstances its duty, 68 to enact 
laws to eradicate discrimination can be understood as a derivative of the equal protection 
mandate generally, and specifically, Section 5.  The framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment assumed that states were the primary threat to equality.   The equal 
protection guarantee, by its terms, applies only to the states—not to the federal 
64 TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-26, at 1010; see also id. § 12-1, at 785 n.1 (“Freedom of association is 
not mentioned in the constitutional text, but it is recognized at least as a derivative safeguard of an 
individual’s rights of speech and assembly when exercised in a group.”).
65 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
66 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 959 (3d ed. 2000); 
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441, 477 (2000).
67 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett , 531 U.S. 356, 384 (2001) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18 at 800.
68 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (state must “eliminate . . . 
all vestiges of state-imposed segregation”); Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent Cty., Va., 391 U.S. 
430, 437-38 (1968) (state that has discriminated has “affirmative duty” to take whatever steps are necessary 
to eliminate discrimination “root and branch”); see also Lawrence, supra note 4, at 439 (reading Brown to 
require “the affirmative disestablishment of societal practices that treat people as members of an inferior or 
dependent caste”).  Cf. Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507, 
538 (1999) (“Bias crime legislation is simply an expression of the greater duty of the state to protect its 
vulnerable members.”).
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government.  As such, the Fourteenth Amendment requires states not to discriminate.  
But in light of their history of maintaining oppression in numerous respects,69 the 
Constitution should encourage, if not require, them to do more than simply refrain from 
discriminating in the future.70  Equality-based state laws redress “a number of serious 
social and personal harms” and secure the state’s interest in “wide participation in 
political, economic, and cultural life.”71
Further, voluntary state acknowledgment of the sins of its discriminatory past and 
construction of remedies to prevent future discrimination and eradicate the vestiges of 
past discrimination are preferable to coercive federal efforts.72  The former approach 
directly addresses the problem at its source rather than requiring another level of 
government to monitor the states and to impose a solution from on high.  Rarely will 
federal monitoring reveal a nationwide problem broad and politically compelling enough 
to move Congress to enact legislation pursuant to Section 5.  Consequently, Congress 
may overlook or fail to address low-level and/or regional instances of discrimination.  
Relatedly, federal legislation, when it is enacted, is often unduly broad, imprecise and 
crudely prophylactic in nature.  Such laws raise complicated issues of comity and 
69 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 68.
70
 Hence, Justice Thomas’ assertion that, despite the long history of state discrimination erecting 
and facilitating obstacles to African-American progress, such as barring slaves from reading, states 
should now simply “‘Do nothing with us!’” is a peculiar understanding of the meaning of 
“justice.”  Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2350 (2003) (Thomas , J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting Fredrick Douglass).
71 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).  States, of course, could not enforce 
conceptions of equality that would violate Supreme Court interpretations of the equality guarantee.
72
 The Court’s equal protection and Title VII cases have emphasized the virtues of voluntary 
compliance.  See, e.g., Johnson v. v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 650 (1987) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (relying on “this Court’s and Congress’ consistent emphasis on the 
value of the voluntary efforts to further the antidiscrimination purposes of Title VII”); Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288-90 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment).
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tailoring with which the Court has famously struggled over the last few years.73  The 
Court perceives Section 5 legislation as an accusation of discrimination from one 
sovereign to another, a charge it finds deeply troubling.74  In addition, the Court’s 
federalism cases are motivated by its desire to keep Congress is its proper place and 
preserve for itself the power to interpret the Constitution.75  All of these concerns are 
alleviated when states remedy discrimination in the first instance.  The same federalism 
concerns that have driven the Court to shrink the Congress’ Section 5 powers—
promoting local autonomy and experimentalism, separation of powers and comity 
concerns—should at least cause it to hesitate before trampling on state antidiscrimination 
laws.  
In contrast to many of the Section 5 cases, which of course involved federal 
equality-based laws, when a state antidiscrimination law is at issue, the Court can 
promote and enhance both local sovereignty and the Constitution’s equality guarantee.  In 
restricting Congress’ power to regulate discrimination, the Court has cited with approval 
73 See, e.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003); Garrett, 531 U.S. 
at 372-76 (requiring legislation to be congruent and proportional); Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel, Protecting the Constitution From the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five 
Power, 78 IND. L. J. 1, 11 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions].  
74 See Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 73, at 13-14, 16.
75 See id. at 2.  The Federalist Justices have also indicated that permitting states to experiment with various 
regulatory approaches is preferable to uniform federal regulation.  See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 
264 (1983) (Burger, J., dissenting) (“Flexibility for experimentation not only permits each state to find the 
best solutions to its own problems, it is the means by which each state may profit from the experiences and 
activities of all the rest.  Nothing in the Constitution permits Congress to force the states into a Procrustean 
national mold that takes no account of local needs and conditions.  That is the antithesis of what the authors 
of the Constitution contemplated for our federal system.”).  Regardless of what one thinks of this argument 
as a basis for restricting federal power, state equality-based laws do considerably contribute to the 
deliberative process regarding the regulation of societal discrimination.  Several states banned 
discrimination in places of public accommodation before the federal government did so, which likely 
contributed to the eventual enactment of federal protections.  See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624; United States 
Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981) (“In 1885, ten years before the United States Supreme 
Court put its imprimatur on the ‘separate but equal’ fiction justifying the Jim Crow laws, the legislature of 
the State of Minnesota chose a different course, that of ‘full and equal’ privileges [regardless of race].”). 
Similarly, the pre-existing state disability discrimination laws helped form the consensus that moved 
Congress to pass the Americans with Disability Act.  See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5
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state laws that address the same goal and has held out hope that groups such as people 
with disabilities may obtain relief at the state level.76  In Garrett, for instance, the Court 
suggested that the widespread existence of state laws addressing disability discrimination 
undercut the need for the federal disability law.77  The Court has not, however, connected 
this important function of state law in federalism cases to its speech-equality cases, such 
as R.A.V. and Boy Scouts, where, I will argue, the Court greeted state civil rights laws 
with antipathy.78  Given that state civil rights laws in general are congruent with the 
Fourteenth Amendment and mitigate the “especially knotty issues”79 of separation or 
powers and federalism implicated by congressional efforts, such laws should enjoy a 
special stature in our constitutional regime.  Even if state efforts to advance equality 
should not receive the full latitude that a proper interpretation of Section 580 would afford 
the federal government, they ought not be hampered by an overreaching interpretation of 
the First Amendment that leaves little room for equality, as in R.A.V.81
76 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996) (relying on the 
“severe consequence” of being deprived of protection under state and local antidiscrimination laws); 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995) 
(declaring that state antidiscrimination laws are “well within the state’s usual power to enact when a 
legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination”). 
77 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5 (noting that the states led the way in fighting disability discrimination; 
every state had such a law prior to the enactment of the ADA).
78
 Even when federalism principles are more apparent, the Court’s adherence to respect for state 
governments is hardly an unbroken line.  See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
79
 Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 73, at 2.
80 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (setting forth the proper standard).
81
 Additionally, many state antidiscrimination laws are sensitive to the constitutional requirement to balance 
equality and speech interests.  Like Title VII, which exempts small employers with fewer than 15 
employees and certain private clubs, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), state laws often mitigate First Amendment 
concerns by creating exceptions for truly private organizations.  See, e.g., N. J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5l (West 
Supp. 2003) (statute at issue in Boy Scouts) (“Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to 
apply to any institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private; 
nor shall anything herein contained apply to any educational facility operated or maintained by a bona fide 
religious or sectarian institution . . . ”); McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 771 (interpreting statute at issue in 
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IV. The Supreme Court’s Tendency to Privilege Speech over Equality
A. Roberts v. United States Jaycees’ Foundational, Balancing Approach
The Court has balanced First Amendment interests against equality interests in a 
number of cases involving racial, gender and sexual orientation exclusion.  Although the 
Court’s early cases, starting with Roberts v. United States Jaycees,82 affirmed the 
importance of the Constitution’s equality guarantee and state efforts to effectuate that 
guarantee, recent cases have privileged First Amendment interests, thereby subordinating 
equality.  In privileging speech interests over equality interests and rendering the latter 
largely invisible, the Court has fallen prey to a form of First Amendment fetishism 
pursuant to which speech presumptively trumps equality.  Such a strong First 
Amendment presumption, even if generally valid, has no place where the Court is tasked 
with balancing speech and equality, both of which are constitutional commitments of the 
highest order.  It seems the Justices have gotten so wrapped up in the magical elixir of 
canonical First Amendment principles that they have at times neglected the application of 
such principles to the facts before them, failing to tether their grandiloquent 
proclamations to practical reality and the human beings whose lives and liberty rest in the 
Justices’ hands.  In contrast to this lopsided approach to speech and equality 
intersections, a proportionate analysis of the interests on both sides of the balance 
requires a detailed, fact-specific examination of each interest and the extent to which 
speech interests would be impaired by applying equality-based laws.  
In Roberts, the Court assessed whether a state anti-discrimination law that 
mandated access for certain statutorily protected groups unconstitutionally trenched upon 
Roberts) (“Private associations and organizations those, for example, that are selective in membership are 
unaffected by [the statute].”).
82
 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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the First Amendment right of association, and in so doing it laid the foundation for future
cases such as Boy Scouts.  The United States Jaycees (“Jaycees”), a non-profit civic 
organization formerly called a chamber of commerce, had attempted to revoke the 
charters of local chapters in Minnesota that admitted women in violation of the 
organization’s bylaws.83  After the Minnesota Department of Human Rights initiated an 
investigation of the Jaycees, the Jaycees brought suit in federal court against the state.84
When the dispute reached the Supreme Court, the Roberts Court recognized the 
instrumental importance of association to speech.  “[A] right to associate for the purpose 
of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, 
petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion” is “an indispensable 
means of preserving [such] individual liberties.”85  Hence, association is often a 
necessary means of accomplishing expressive ends.86
Moreover, the Roberts Court said, “There can be no clearer example of an 
intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that 
forces the group to accept members it does not desire.”87  The Roberts Court explained 
the primary danger of forced inclusion in the next sentence:  “Such a regulation may 
83 See id. at 614-15.
84 See id. at 615.
85 Id. at 618; see also id. at 622 (“[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in 
activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in 
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”); 
id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Protection of the 
association’s right to define its membership derives from the recognition that the formation of an 
expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of 
that voice.”); TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-1, at 785 n.1 (“Freedom of association is not mentioned in 
the constitutional text, but it is recognized at least as a derivative safeguard of an individual’s 
rights of speech and association when exercised in a group.”); Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 
294.  
86 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1180 (2001) (“Groups have resources—in 
human capital and money—that a single person lacks.”).  
87 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.  
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impair the ability of the original members to express only those views that brought them 
together.”88  Therefore, in assessing speech-equality intersections, the harm stems not 
from the mere presence of a disfavored individual in the group.  If the locus of the harm 
were the offense caused by mere presence, presumably every business owner forced by 
Title VII to hire African-Americans or women would have a valid First Amendment 
claim, but that clearly is not so.89  Instead, the harm of forced inclusion arises from a 
governmentally compelled change in the message the association desires to express.  
Where an association is not attempting to express a particular message (as is the case 
with many businesses), or where the inclusion of an outsider does not impair the group’s 
goals or message, there is no legitimate speech-related objection.  Just as the First 
Amendment usually requires people to tolerate speech that they find offensive, it 
normally requires people such as business owners to tolerate the presence of members of 
disfavored groups, absent a showing that such presence would unduly impair the 
organization’s speech or associational goals.90
The Roberts Court was skeptical that the forced inclusion of women would alter 
the Jaycees message, but it ultimately declined to resolve that issue.91  It questioned 
whether the inclusion of women truly would change the character of the organization and 
thus impair the Jaycees’ speech interest.  The Court refused to “indulge in sexual [] 
stereotyping” and “rel[y] solely” on “unsupported generalizations about the relative 
88 Id.
89 See id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The 
Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those with 
whom one engages in simple commercial transactions, without restraint from the State.  A 
shopkeeper has no constitutional right to deal only with persons of one sex.”).  
90 See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 663 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(interpreting Roberts).
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interests and perspectives of men and women.”92  It noted: “‘the specific content of most 
of the resolutions adopted over the years by the Jaycees has nothing to do with sex.”93
The Court went on to conclude that any abridgement of the Jaycees’ speech interest was 
justified by the state’s compelling interest in prohibiting gender discrimination.  “[A]cts 
of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and 
other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to 
prevent—wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit.”94  The 
Roberts Court looked closely at both the equality and speech dimensions of the dispute.  
Ultimately declining to resolve the question of whether there was any impairment of the 
Jaycees’ First Amendment interests, it found that to the extent there was some 
impairment, it was too minimal to outweigh the stronger interest in gender equality.  The 
Court’s close examination of both sides of the balance, recognition of the concrete harms 
of gender discrimination as well as the legitimacy of the state’s interest in redressing 
them and the Court’s skepticism about stereotypical assumptions established a balanced 
and sound, if somewhat ambiguous, framework for future cases.95
B. The Court Departs from the Roberts Framework
In the Boy Scouts and R.A.V. cases, the Court neglected the Constitution’s equal 
protection command and departed from the framework established by Roberts.  Although 
in this section I focus on unpacking the equality aspects of Boy Scouts and R.A.V., I do 
91 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-628 (“[E]ven if enforcement of the Act causes some incidental 
abridgement of the Jaycees’ protected speech, that effect is no greater than is necessary to 
accomplish the State’s legitimate purposes.”).  
92 Id. at 628.  
93 Id. at 627 (quoting United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1571 (8th Cir. 1983)).
94 Id. at 628.
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not mean to suggest that judges should privilege equality.  Nor do I mean to suggest that 
equality should uniformly or usually trump speech interests.  Because the Court’s 
opinions in these cases privileged First Amendment analysis, I focus on the interest that 
the Court neglected, which in these cases happens to be the equality interest.  In doing so, 
I accept the core First Amendment principles and precedents, but I conclude that equality 
considerations suggest that the Court should trim a few excessive applications of the First 
Amendment, such as those in R.A.V. and Boy Scouts.  
In discussing equality, I draw on an anti-caste or anti-stratification conception of 
constitutional equality similar to that proposed by Cass Sunstein96 and refined by 
subsequent scholars.97  This conception of equality requires not mere equality in form but 
examines actual societal conditions from a historical perspective.  It seeks to eliminate 
systematic disadvantages that relegate a specific class of people to perpetual second-class 
citizenship.98  It understands that the “Civil War Amendments were based on a wholesale 
rejection of the supposed naturalness of racial hierarchy” and instigated “an attack on 
racial caste.”99  The Equal Protection Clause’s more general wording, which does not 
restrict the Fourteenth Amendment to race, suggests a concern with protecting other 
classes to the extent that they are subject to a caste-like system.  
95
 The Court followed this approach in a few brief opinions that relied substantially on Roberts.  See New 
York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club 
of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 541 (1987).
96 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2428-29 (1994) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Anticaste Principle]; see also Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 107 (1976), reprinted in Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader 505 (John H. Garvey & T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff eds., 1999).   
97 See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the 
Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998) [hereinafter Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias].
98 See Sunstein, Anticaste Principle, supra note 96, at 2436.
99 Id. at 2435.
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The current Court majority is often viewed as adhering to a colorblind conception 
of equality.100  Complicating this picture is precedent such as Grutter, which departed 
from the colorblind ideal in order to create a diverse class of leaders in society, 101 and 
Romer,102 which has been understood as a prohibition on state efforts to brand gays and 
lesbians as second-class citizens.103  Earlier cases, including Runyon and Hishon, in 
which the Court rejected speech interests when they stood in the way of the judicial 
project of eliminating the subordinate status of African-Americans and women, also 
appear to be animated by anti- caste impulses.  These cases, as well as foundational cases 
such as Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia,104 militate against an 
attempt to explain the Court’s equality jurisprudence by reference to a single conception 
of equality.105  Drawing on these extant strands of anti-caste-ism, the proportionate 
approach incorporates and extends a thicker understanding of equality than the formal, 
colorblind model.  
This view of equality is less concerned with the source of a measure, whether that 
measure threatens equality or advances it, than the policy’s concrete impact on equality.  
In my view, the courts have made too much of the public/private distinction and the 
state/federal distinction.  Thus, state laws that advance equality should be afforded 
100 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination? (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1, on file with author); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954)).
101 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2340 (2003).
102 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies 
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. . . .  A State 
cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”).
103 See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMM. 257 (1996), reprinted in
Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader, supra note 96, at 727.  
104
 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
105 See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 100 (manuscript at 2-3, on file with author).
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greater respect, and private wrongs should not be discounted simply because they have 
not been blessed by governmental authority.  State antidiscrimination laws make an 
important contribution to equality that might be overlooked if they are viewed as garden-
variety exercises of the state’s police power.  Similarly, in regulating employment, a 
critical portal to socioeconomic advancement, Title VII should not be denigrated as a 
mere statute that simply regulates private conduct.106  Antidiscrimination laws—federal 
and state, constitutional and statutory—work in tandem to regulate the public and the 
private and thus instantiate the Constitution’s robust, anti-stratification conception of 
equality.  Formal labeling and atomistic interpretations of the law, by contrast, often 
threaten to obscure the synergistic interconnectedness of antidiscrimination 
protections.107 Legislative efforts to advance equality are rooted in the Equal Protection 
Clause and, unlike judicial efforts, also enjoy majoritarian support.  Although I do not 
argue that the aforementioned distinctions (state/federal, public/private) should lose all 
legal significance, an approach that looks to personal experience suggests skepticism of 
formal demarcations that might elude non-lawyers.  The individual who is denied a 
promotion, say, or access to an education due to race or gender is unlikely to gain any 
comfort from the knowledge that the employer or educational institution is private rather 
than public.  In short, the nature of the harm suffered (and the effort to redress it) is far 
more important than its source.  With these prefatory remarks, I now explicate how the 
106 See William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1237-1242, 1269 (2001). 
(describing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII, as quasi-constitutional law).
107 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 n.5  (2001) (noting that the 
states led the way in fighting disability discrimination, which created a consensus culminating in the ADA); 
Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the 
Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L. J. 1, 95 & n.116 (1995) (noting how Supreme Court appears 
to have incorporated sexual stereotyping rationale of Title VII cases into its equal protection gender 
jurisprudence); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 106, at 1241-42 (identifying Title VII’s impact on the 
Romer decision).  
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Court’s speech analysis in R.A.V. and Boy Scouts slighted equality, understood from an 
anti-caste perspective.
First, in both cases, the Court essentially acted as if the equality interest did not 
even exist.  Treating the New Jersey antidiscrimination law and the St. Paul hate speech 
law as presenting pure speech issues, the Court ignored concurrent developments in its 
equal protection jurisprudence that would have shed a very different light on the 
legitimacy of the state laws at issue.  In erasing the equality interest, the Court 
unjustifiably privileged the speech interest.  A second but closely related point is that the 
Court applied legal standards that were ill suited for harmonizing the speech and equality 
interests.  In mechanically adopting rigid First Amendment tests that largely 
predetermined the outcome in each case,108 the Court deprived itself of the flexibility 
necessary to unravel intricate speech-equality intersections.  Even where the outcome of a 
particular case might be the same under the proportionate approach, as in the Boy Scouts
case, the Boy Scouts majority’s legal standard—which grants exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws on the basis of a mere assertion of a First Amendment defense—
does major violence to equality-based laws.  Third, I explore the Court’s 
misapprehension of context and show how it produced lopsided equality-speech analysis 
in each case.  
James Dale became a Boy Scout at eight years old and was by all accounts 
“exemplary,” even earning the title of Eagle Scout.109  He went on to become an active 
assistant scoutmaster of a troop in New Jersey.  He came out of the closet during college 
108 See Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 785 (“Current free speech law, like current equal protection law, is 
almost obsessively organized around the proliferation of well-known ‘standards of review’ or ‘levels of 
scrutiny.’”).
109 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
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at Rutgers and acknowledged his homosexual orientation during a college seminar that 
was covered by the school newspaper.110  When Scout leaders learned of this story, they 
sent Dale a letter expelling him from the group because he was a homosexual.111  New 
Jersey punished this decision as discrimination in violation of its civil rights laws, and the 
Boy Scouts invoked the First Amendment as a defense.  The U.S. Supreme Court agreed 
with the Boy Scouts that its expulsion of Dale was protected activity.112  In analyzing the 
case, however, the Court essentially proceeded as if it was dealing with a basic speech 
case and refused to acknowledge the existence and complexity of Dale’s countervailing 
equality interest.  
As discussed above, the Roberts Court held that, even assuming an incidental 
impairment on the Jaycees’ First Amendment right of association, the application of the 
Minnesota antidiscrimination statute to the Jaycees was constitutional because it 
furthered a compelling governmental interest, the eradication of discrimination against 
women.  In striking contrast to Roberts’ effort to obtain a balance between equality and 
speech, the Boy Scouts Court refused seriously to engage the case’s equality dimension. 
As in Roberts, Dale argued that the state had a compelling interest sufficient to override 
any impairment of the Boy Scouts’ speech interest. 113  To say that the Court gave short 
shrift to this equality argument would give the Court too much credit.  It dismissed the 
equality interest in one conclusory sentence.  Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
We have already concluded that a state requirement that the Boy 
Scouts retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly 
110 See id. at 644-45.
111 See id. at 645.
112 See id. at 661.
113
 Brief for Respondent at 2-3, 12 n.8, 33-39, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 
99-699).
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burden the organization’s right to oppose or disfavor homosexual 
conduct.  The state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public 
accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy 
Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association.  That being the 
case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the State from 
imposing such a requirement through the application of its public 
accommodations law.114
Whereas Roberts attempted to reconcile equality and speech, Boy Scouts
eliminated the conflict by mere judicial fiat.  The Court did not even pause to tell us the 
“state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public accommodations law” that it was 
blithely rejecting.  The unarticulated interest can be found by examining the Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence.  Just four years earlier, the Court had ruled in favor of 
gays and lesbians in a landmark discrimination case.  Purporting to apply mere rational 
basis scrutiny in Romer v. Evans,115 the Court nonetheless invalidated a Colorado state 
constitutional amendment barring all state and local laws and policies against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  The Court brushed aside plausible 
justifications for the amendment as blithely as the Boy Scouts Court would later dismiss 
Dale’s equality argument.  In Romer, the Court concluded that the real—and 
constitutionally forbidden—motive behind the challenged law was “animus.”116  Despite 
this momentous precedent, which some constitutional scholars understood as an implicit 
form of heightened scrutiny for laws burdening gays and lesbians, or at least a step in that 
direction,117 the Boy Scouts Court did not mention Romer and the beefed-up equal 
114 Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added).
115
 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
116 Id. at 632.
117 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 U.C.L.A. 
L. REV. 1183, 1217 (2000) (describing Romer as a “cautious and imprecise equal protection trial balloon 
[that might be] followed by bolder rulings”).
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protection scrutiny that the Court had employed.118   Justice Stevens’ dissent, although 
very pro-gay in sentiment, also failed to appreciate Romer.  
The Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down a sodomy 
law that criminalized gay sexual conduct, expressly reinforces Romer’s robustness and 
continuing significance for gay equality.119 Romer, in the words of Justice Kennedy, who 
wrote both Lawrence and Romer, “serious[ly] ero[ded]” Bowers v. Hardwick, which had 
been the cornerstone of efforts to deny gay equality.120 Lawrence, although principally 
based on due process rather than equal protection, adds to equality’s momentum, in that 
the two constitutional commitments “are linked in important respects” and a decision on 
one ground “advances both interests.”121  Somehow the same Court that ruled in favor of 
gay and lesbian equality in Romer and Lawrence did not think the equality interest in 
Boy Scouts even deserved discussion.122
The Court’s lapse may arise from the case’s superficial similarity to the standard 
paradigm of a constitutional claim: A state law was applied in a way that was said to 
conflict with the Constitution.  Because the Supremacy Clause dictates that state law 
118 Boy Scouts’ elision of Romer is not unlike Romer’s own evasion of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003), a precedent difficult to 
square with Romer’s holding.  
119 See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2482 (noting the “tenable argument” that “Romer provides the basis for 
declaring the Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause”).
120 Id. at 2474.
121 Id. at 2482; see generally Eskridge, Destabilizing Due Process, supra note 117 (arguing that due process 
and equal protection are interconnected and that both take into account backward-looking and forward-
looking concerns).
122 Some might argue, contrary to Romer’s analysis, that sexual orientation discrimination is subject to 
mere rational basis review, and that bare-bones level of scrutiny distinguishes Roberts, because gender 
classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny.  The difference in levels of equal protection scrutiny 
does not automatically resolve the issue, however.  In Roberts, even though precedent held that gender 
classifications were subject only to intermediate scrutiny and needed to find support in “important” (rather 
than “compelling”) state interests, the Court held that eradicating gender discrimination was a compelling
government interest “of the highest order.”  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) 
(emphasis added).  Hence, the level of equal protection scrutiny does not necessarily dictate the weight that 
the equality interest warrants when balancing equality and speech interests.  
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must give way to federal rights,123 the Court may have viewed Boy Scouts as any other 
First Amendment case.  But the dispute here was considerably more complex, as 
discussed more fully below.  The antidiscrimination law was no ordinary exercise of the 
state’s police power.  As argued in Part III, equality-based laws are rooted in the Civil 
War Amendments and the constitutional project of eradicating a castelike society.  
Because such laws emanate from the equality principles of the Civil War Amendments 
and alleviate a number of the constitutional problems created by federal 
antidiscrimination regulation, they should be entitled to greater respect than the Court has 
afforded them on occasion.  At a minimum, the Boy Scouts Court should not have 
adjudicated the First Amendment claim without grappling with the countervailing 
equality interest.
In order to bolster its erasure of the equality interest, the Boy Scouts Court recast 
Roberts’ holding.  The Court distinguished Roberts by stating that Roberts had found no 
“serious burden[]” on the Jaycees’ right of expressive association.124  But Roberts held no 
such thing.  Instead, after questioning the extent of impairment, the Roberts Court 
assumed that there was an impairment of the expressive interest and went on to hold that 
the state had an overriding compelling governmental interest in eliminating 
discrimination: “We are persuaded that Minnesota’s compelling interest in eradicating 
discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the 
statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members’ associational freedoms.”125  Some 
123
 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
124 Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 658.
125 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; see, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 86, at 1189 (“The Supreme Court 
has held that the compelling interest in stopping discrimination justifies interfering with . . . 
associational freedoms.”) (citing Roberts, 486 U.S. at 609); Eskridge, supra note 19, at 2449 
(“Writing for the Court, Justice William Brennan conceded that the antidiscrimination law 
burdened the Jaycees’ First Amendment associational rights but ruled that the law served a 
compelling state interest . . . .”).  The Roberts Court’s assumption of an impairment of a speech 
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scholars have understood Roberts as demanding clear evidence of impairment of the 
speech interest and definitively concluding that there was no impairment in the case 
before it.126  Yet the Court’s tentative language in this passage of its opinion weighs 
against such a reading.127
The Roberts majority also may be understood as holding in the alternative that (1) 
there was no intrusion on the Jaycees’ speech interests; and (2) to the extent there was an 
intrusion, it was justified by a compelling interest.128  Even under this reading, however, 
there was no basis for the Court to sever these conclusions and ignore entirely the second 
independent holding.  There may ultimately be arguable reasons why the Boy Scouts are 
different from the Jaycees, as a constitutional matter, or why the interest in protecting 
women should be afforded greater weight than the interest in protecting gays and 
lesbians, but the Court failed entirely to engage these questions.  Whereas the Roberts
majority accepted that antidiscrimination laws “protect[] the State’s citizenry from a 
number of serious social and personal harms” by safeguarding “individual dignity [and 
ensuring access to] political, economic, and cultural life,”129 the Boy Scouts Court was 
indifferent to the equality interests of people such as Dale.  The Court privileged speech 
interest prompted a sharply worded opinion by Justice O’Connor, who would have resolved the 
case by finding that the organization was not sufficiently expressive, and thus concurred in the 
judgment.  See Roberts, 486 U.S. at 631-40 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
126 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay and 
Lesbian Equality, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85, 104 (1998) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Accommodating 
Outness] (referring to “Roberts’ strict analysis of defendants’ expressive goals”); Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, “Closet Case”: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Reinforcement of Gay, 
Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Invisibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 81, 96-97 (2001) [hereinafter 
Hutchinson, Closet Case].
127 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627 (characterizing the claim of impairment as “attenuated at best”); 
id. at 628 (gender-based generalizations asserted by Jaycees “may or may not have a statistical 
basis in fact”); id. (“even if enforcement of the Act causes some incidental abridgment of the 
Jaycees’ protected speech”); cf. also Hutchinson, Closet Case, supra note 126, at 97 (concluding 
that the Court “likely undervalued the potential ideological differences between men and 
women”).   
128 See Hutchinson, Closet Case, supra note 126, at 96 n.90.  
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over equality and did so without even a glancing recognition of the importance of 
equality.  Further, in mischaracterizing Roberts’ holding, the Court diminished an 
important precedent for holding that an equality interest could trump a free speech 
interest.  Boy Scouts thus jettisoned Roberts’ “‘equality-sensitive,’ yet balanced, 
framework.”130  Although the Court did not admit to this departure, its analysis shows a 
failure to “honestly appl[y] . . . the central components of Roberts.”131
R.A.V. similarly erased equality from the equation.  Because the Court has been 
most vigilant in policing race and gender discrimination, while gays and lesbians, in light 
of Lawrence, are relative newcomers to the constitutional fold, R.A.V.’s equality elision 
seems more glaring than Boy Scouts’.  The pattern, however, is much the same.  Because 
of the elaborate structure of the R.A.V. opinion and the considerable extent to which it 
restructured First Amendment law, a detailed explanation of R.A.V.’s holdings and 
exceptions is necessary to lay the foundation for my critique.  I will show that the Court 
in R.A.V., as in Boy Scouts, myopically treated the case at hand as if it were simply a 
First Amendment case.  
The majority opinion in R.A.V. established two key holdings, one laudable and 
now uncontroversial, and one extremely contentious.  The Court evaluated the St. Paul, 
Minnesota Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which stated: 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, 
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited 
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has 
129 Roberts, 468 U.S at 625.
130
 Hutchinson, Closet Case, supra note 126, at 86.  Importantly, Roberts had indicated that the 
commercial nature of an organization weakens its associational interest in excluding particular 
groups.  See Roberts, 468 U.S at 625-26; id. at 632-33 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).  
Although the Boy Scouts Court hinted that the Boy Scouts is not a “clearly commercial” 
organization, it failed expressly to cabin its deferential approach to noncommercial organizations.  
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 104 (noting uncertain issues after Boy Scouts).
131 Id.
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reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits 
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.132
  Despite an array of content-neutral statutes that it could have invoked, 
the city relied on its bias law to prosecute the petitioner, a teenager who was 
charged with burning a cross in the yard of an African-American family that lived 
near his home.133  Although the language of the ordinance was unduly broad—
punishing particular expression if it merely “arouses anger, alarm, or resentment 
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”134—the R.A.V.
majority accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court’s “authoritative” narrowing 
construction that the ordinance reached only “those expressions that constitute 
‘fighting words’ within the meaning of Chaplinsky.”135  In Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire,136 the Court had upheld a prosecution of a political protestor who 
insulted a police officer and in so doing violated a New Hampshire statute 
regulating offensive language.137  Instead of revisiting Chaplinsky and the 
132 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1991) (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 
292.02 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
133 See id. at 379-80.
134 Id. at 380.
135 Id. at 381.
136
 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
137 The New Hampshire statute provided: 
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person 
who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or 
derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent 
to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or 
occupation.
Id. at 569.  Subsequently, the Court narrowed Chaplinsky in a string of cursory opinions.  See
Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 295-
96 (1990) (citing, inter alia, Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) and Lewis v. City of New 
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974)).  Chaplinsky remains problematic to the extent it conditions 
regulation of speech on the victim’s propensity to fight.  Such an approach would appear to grant 
greater protection to a boisterous frat boy than a petite woman, an elderly man, or an African-
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question of its continued validity and proper scope, the R.A.V. majority first held, 
despite dicta in several prior opinions, that there are limits on the government’s 
ability to regulate within a category of speech that the Court had described as 
“unprotected.”  Such “unprotected” speech is in fact protected, R.A.V. held, 
insofar as the common First Amendment tenet prohibiting content and viewpoint-
based discrimination extends even to such marginal expression.138  Thus, even 
with respect to so-called fighting words, “[c]ontent-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.”139  To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would permit 
the government to ban, for example, “only those legally obscene works that 
contain criticism of the city government.”140
Once the Court aligned the St. Paul ordinance with the myriad content-based laws 
that the Court had invalidated, the expected outcome was clear.   Before saddling the bias
law with a rigid presumption of constitutional invalidity, however, the Court should have 
consulted its equality jurisprudence.  There is so little acknowledgement of equality in 
R.A.V. that a foreign reader of the majority opinion might not even grasp that the U.S. 
Constitution contains an Equal Protection Clause.141  This omission becomes even more 
apparent when one considers that Justice Scalia, a textualist, who should have been the 
American professional, to the extent such people may be less inclined or able to fight.  In essence, 
those people most effectively intimidated and silenced would receive the least protection from 
injurious verbal attacks.  See Greenawalt, supra, at 297-99 (“The hurt in a particular instance may 
not correlate with a willingness to fight; indeed, words may hurt the defenseless more than those 
who are able to strike back.”); see also Lawrence, supra note 4, at 454 (“The fighting words 
doctrine is a paradigm based on a white male point of view.”).  
138 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 124, 125 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, Missing Amendments] (describing this aspect 
of R.A.V.’s holding as an outgrowth of the Court’s “plainly right” decision in Texas v. Johnson).
139 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377.
140 Id. at 384.  
141 See Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 125 (“All nine Justices analyzed cross 
burning and other forms of racial hate speech by focusing almost exclusively on the First 
Amendment.”).  
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last to forget that the First Amendment applied to local government only because of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, wrote the majority opinion.142
The R.A.V. Court’s conclusion that the ordinance illegitimately singled out race, 
gender and religion for protection flies in the face of the manner in which the Court has 
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause.  As the seminal footnote four in United States v. 
Carolene Products143 demonstrates, the Court has long assessed the characteristics of 
groups in order to determine how rigorously it will scrutinize a law affecting that 
group.144  Accordingly, the Court has distinguished traits associated with enduring forms 
of discrimination, including racial, gender and religious discrimination, from non-suspect 
classifications which burden other economic or social groups, such as unions.145  Title 
142 See id. at 151-52.  
143
 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
144 See Hunter, supra note 2, at 1672 (“[C]ourts must select which groups are entitled to 
heightened judicial review of laws that disadvantage them.”).
145 See, e.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003) (distinguishing 
age and disability discrimination from gender discrimination, which “triggers a heightened level of 
scrutiny”); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Today’s skeptical scrutiny of 
official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history.  As a 
plurality of this Court acknowledged a generation ago, ‘our Nation has had a long and unfortunate 
history of sex discrimination.’”) (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion of 
Brennan, J.)); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993) (“Classifying citizens by race, as we have 
said, threatens special harms . . . .”); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 
(1985) (stating that broad legislative discretion and accompanying presumption of validity “give[] 
way . . . when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin”); Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (relying on the “unique evils” caused by gender 
discrimination); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) 
(distinguishing age discrimination from adverse treatment of groups such as African-Americans, 
who have been “subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process”); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (distinguishing 
classifications in general from racial classifications “in light of the historical fact that the central 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from 
official sources in the States.  This strong policy renders racial classifications ‘constitutionally 
suspect.’”) (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).  
In contrast to the judicial precedent according race and gender suspect/quasi-suspect 
status, “‘the text of the First Amendment itself ‘singles out’ religion for special protections.’”  
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting 
Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. CT. REV. 1, 9).  Accordingly, religious 
adherents challenging governmental action typically rely on one of the First Amendment’s 
Religion Clauses, rather than resort to the more general Equal Protection Clause.  As a result, the 
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VII, which the R.A.V. Court cited with approval in R.A.V., also singles out “race, color, 
religion, [and] sex” as prohibited forms of employment discrimination.146  Suspect and 
quasi-suspect groups receive special protection in the form of careful judicial scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause in light of a variety of factors including original intent, 
political power and immutatability.147  Classifications burdening the remaining groups 
are subject to mere rational basis review, meaning of course that the Court almost 
invariably upholds them.148  Given that the Court itself had extended special protection to 
the very same groups identified in the St. Paul ordinance, and had declined to do so for 
other groups such as political parties, how could the R.A.V. Court conclude that the St. 
Paul ordinance’s distinctions were illegitimate?  In so doing, the Court dismissed and 
subordinated the Civil War Amendments and their profound impact on the entire 
Constitution, including the First Amendment.  The Civil War Amendments, including the 
Equal Protection Clause, teach that efforts by government (whether state or federal) to 
Court has not squarely had to resolve whether religion is a suspect or quasi-suspect class because 
any religion-based government action that would violate the Equal Protection Clause would also 
likely violate the Free Exercise Clause or Establishment Clause.  Whether viewed as a First 
Amendment or equal protection issue, however, the result is the same.  Laws that target religion 
“trigger[] constitutional concern—and heightened judicial scrutiny.”  Id. (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); see also Eskridge, supra note 19, at 2419 (“[T]he Free Exercise Clause operates as a 
super-Equal Protection Clause for classifications.”); Greene, supra note 53, at 11 (“religion is 
distinctive, for constitutional purposes”); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument 
for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1783 (1996) [hereinafter Yoshino, 
Suspect Symbols].  That the special status of religion may be rooted in the First Amendment, 
rather than the Fourteenth, only underscores the R.A.V. Court’s narrow vision in disregarding the 
Speech Clause’s textual neighbors.
146
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2003).
147 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 2, at 1687-88.  The immutability prong has been rightly criticized 
by various scholars.  See, e.g., Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias, supra note 97, at 490 & n.14.
148 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Heller v. Doe, 509 
U.S. 312, 318-21 (1993); see also Hunter, supra note 2, at 1686.
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ensure equality are desirable and consonant with the Constitution—if the document is 
interpreted holistically, rather than in a doctrinally segmented fashion.149
R.A.V.’s analytical head-on collision with Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence 
is evidenced by the Court’s hypothetical of a law that would be permissible under its 
ruling: “We cannot think of any First Amendment interest that would stand in the way of 
a State’s prohibiting only those obscene motion pictures with blue-eyed actresses.”150
According to the Court, even though it is facially content-based, a law favoring a group 
lacking any history of serious discrimination (non-blue-eyed actors) would not give rise 
to First Amendment suspicion, while a law protecting African-Americans, women and 
religious minorities would be presumptively unconstitutional.  The R.A.V. Court thus 
erroneously set the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause at cross-
purposes.151  Under the Court’s view, the government’s ability to curb expression is at its 
apex when it legislates with respect to traits that lack historical and contextual 
significance, which stands Equal Protection Clause analysis on its head.152  Recognizing 
149 Cf. Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 5, at 1131 (criticizing those who have analyzed the Bill 
of Rights as if it were “chopped up into discrete chunks of text, with each bit examined in 
isolation”); Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 802 (arguing that “the free speech 
principle can march hand-in-hand with the [Fourteenth Amendment] anticaste principle . . . .   
When tension does arise, courts ought to minimize infringements on either principle.”).  But see
Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1647 (1993).
150 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992).  Despite the Court’s use of the term 
“actress,” presumably the law would apply to blue-eyed women and men.  I assume that the Court 
did not mean to suggest that the law would contain a gender classification.  
151
 “[J]urists should resist automatically treating liberty and equality as oppositional goals; their 
relationship is far more intricate and complicated than this reductionist approach recognizes.”  
Hutchinson, Closet Case, supra note 126, at 96; see also Hunter, supra note 2, at 1719 
(“Orthodoxy [a First Amendment concern] and exclusion [an Equal Protection concern] are not, 
and need not be, trade-offs. . . .”).   
152
 As Justice O’Connor emphasized in the Court’s landmark affirmative action case, “Context 
matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.”  
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003); see also Lawrence, supra note 4, at 437 
(criticizing an “ahistorical and idealized” approach to First Amendment interpretation); Matsuda, 
Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2361 (urging consideration of “the historical context in which 
racist speech arises, and attention to the degree of harm experienced by targets of different kinds 
of speech”).  By contrast, when government seeks to protect groups that do not fit the Carolene 
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the equality interest would have led the Court to the conclusion that a law protecting 
outgroups is not more problematic than the blue-eyed-actress law; indeed, it is less so, 
because only with respect to the former law is there a strong countervailing equality 
interest. 
In contrast to the broadened prohibition on content-based discrimination, the 
Court’s second holding—that the St. Paul ordinance did not fit into any of R.A.V.’s 
exceptions to the ban on content-based regulation—provoked bitter disagreement among 
the Justices.  After the Court announced its new rule, it unveiled several exceptions, 
which appeared to be an effort to cabin the effect of the decision and avoid unduly 
destabilizing the law.  Although in theory the exceptions could have muted the harsh 
presumption against content-based discrimination, the majority’s stingy application of the 
exceptions again steadfastly ignored equality considerations.  The Court suggested that 
the exceptions shared a common thread in that regulations promulgated thereunder are 
not susceptible to the charge that the government is attempting to drive certain ideas from 
the marketplace.153  Delineating its first exception, the majority said “[w]hen the basis for 
the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at 
issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.”154
As examples of permissible legislation under this exception, the Court cited the federal 
Products definition of a suspect class, see generally Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The 
Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 18 (2000) [hereinafter Post, 
Prejudicial Appearances] (discussing local ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on physical 
appearance), the constitutional force behind such a law may not be strong enough to withstand a 
First Amendment or other constitutional challenge. 
153 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1991).  
154 Id. at 388.  
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statute that prohibits threats of violence against the President155 and an obscenity law that 
targets only the most prurient obscenity.156
The second exception allows regulation where a subclass of speech “happens to 
be associated with particular ‘secondary effects’ of the speech, so that the regulation is 
justified without reference to the content of the . . .  speech.”157  Therefore, a state could 
ban only obscene live performances by minors.  Further, Title VII’s “general prohibition 
against sexual discrimination in employment practices” is not rendered unconstitutional 
simply because its ban encompasses “sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other 
words” that may produce a Title VII violation.158  “Where the government does not target 
conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation 
merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.”159  Indicating that 
there might be other exceptions that escaped its memory,160 the Court suggested that the 
test for assessing any law that did not neatly fit the foregoing exceptions would be 
whether there is a “realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.”161  The 
Court’s exceptions surely left an ad hoc aftertaste,162 but more problematic than the 
155 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
156 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389.
157 Id. (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).





 In several respects, the Court failed to engage complex questions with respect to why its 
examples of permissible regulation were valid exceptions to the rule.  For example, why should 
the regulatory ban on sexual harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2003), which specifically targets 
speech based on its content, be treated as part of a ban on conduct rather than a freestanding 
speech ban?  Why can’t hate speech bans similarly be viewed as part of a broader regime of 
antidiscrimination law (including employment and housing law) aimed at eradicating private 
action that effectively excludes women and people of color, among others, from public life?  See 
Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2335 (“Gutter racism, parlor racism, corporate racism, 
and governmental racism work in coordination, reinforcing existing conditions of domination.”); 
Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 299 (describing argument that “racist speech ought to be 
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exceptions themselves was the way the Court turned a blind eye to the Equal Protection 
Clause in applying them.  
Remarkably, the Court concluded that the St. Paul ordinance “assuredly” “does 
not fall within the exception for content discrimination based on the very reasons why the 
particular class of speech at issue (here, fighting words) is proscribable.”163  The Court 
denied that the ordinance singled out “a particularly intolerable (and socially 
unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.”164  Yet 
the ordinance can be understood as exactly such a regulation.  It proscribed unusually 
threatening symbols, specifically a burning cross or Nazi swastika, while permitting 
people to express racist and anti-Semitic ideas in any other mode, including any oral 
expression:  the ordinance banned only certain physical objects, including signs, placed 
on public property.165  The Court’s references to “disfavored subjects”166 are thus vast 
characterized as a ‘mechanism of subordination’ within a larger system of suppression, rather than 
as a form of communication”); Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 828 (“[I]f 
R.A.V. is right on neutrality, it is not simple to explain why the civil rights laws survive 
constitutional attack.”); see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Ghettoization 
of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993) (arguing that street harassment based on gender should 
be a legally cognizable harm).  Ironically, in the midst of an opinion that repeatedly privileges 
speech and subordinates equality, the Court flipped this paradigm momentarily, giving short shrift 
to speech by distinguishing and preserving sexual harassment law with a dubious, skeletal 
“secondary effects” argument (which had previously applied only to sexually explicit speech).  
The Court never has fully explained how sexual harassment law can coexist harmoniously with 
the First Amendment, which has created uncertainty.  See Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Aguilar, 
529 U.S. 1138 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that R.A.V.
supports holding sexual harassment laws unconstitutional).  The issue of sexual harassment law is 
beyond the scope of this article.
163 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393. 
164 Id. (emphasis in original).  
165 The ordinance applied only to a person who “places on public or private property a symbol, object, 
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika . . . .”  
505 U.S. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).  A sign with words on it might 
qualify as a “symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti . . . place[d] on public or private 
property,” id. at 379, but mere spoken words, intangibles that cannot be “placed” anywhere, likely would
not. Id. at 402.  Even if a broader construction of the ordinance is tenable, the courts have an obligation to 
interpret a statute to mitigate constitutional problems—not to exacerbate them.  See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 
123 S.Ct. 1536, 1557 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “where one 
of two possible interpretations of the state statute would clearly render it unconstitutional, and the other 
would not . . .  we would adopt the alternative reading that renders the statute constitutional rather than 
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exaggerations.  They erroneously suggest that the ordinance silenced any discussion on 
the subjects of race, religion or gender, or at least silenced one side of the debate, when in 
reality the law was a very narrow prohibition on a particular mode of communication that 
left open most means of expressing hateful ideas regarding the aforementioned 
subjects.167  Moreover, understanding the narrow scope of the ordinance undermines the 
Court’s conclusion that the ordinance was intended to suppress particular ideas.168  If that 
indeed was St. Paul’s intention, the city pursued its purpose in an extremely attenuated 
and ineffectual manner.  Hence, the Court’s assertion that the ordinance, as narrowly 
construed by the state court, banned “fighting words of whatever manner that 
communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance” was hyperbolic.169
Similarly, the Court’s contention that the law did not isolate “only those fighting 
words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious) 
manner” is difficult to understand from an equality perspective.170  The Court’s belief that 
unconstitutional”).  Especially in light of the fact that the ordinance’s only specific examples of prohibited 
conduct are displaying a burning cross and swastika, both of which are physical objects, a properly narrow 
construction of the ordinance would exclude all verbal speech.  As the Court noted, St. Paul asserted that 
“the ordinance applies only to ‘racial, religious, or gender-specific symbols,’ such as ‘a burning cross, Nazi 
swastika or other instrumentality of like import.”  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393 (quoting Brief for Respondent 8) 
(emphasis added); see also id. at 391 (referring to displays, signs, and placards); id. at 435 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (referring to signs).  The Court’s viewpoint discrimination conclusion hence 
relies on the rather implausible assumption that a person responding to the insult “all anti-Catholic bigots 
are misbegotten” would take the time to find some markers and poster board and respond with a sign, rather 
than immediately utter a verbal retort. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391-92.
166 Id. at 391; see also id. at 381.
167 Cf. Delgado, supra note 12, at 177 (“[P]rotecting members of racial minorities from injury 
through racial insults, and society itself from the accumulated harms of racism, is very different 
from prohibiting espousal of the view that race discrimination is proper.”).
168 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393.  
169 Id. (emphasis added).
170 See Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 149 (describing this claim as 
“incomprehensible and other-worldly” if taken at face value); Powell, supra note 3, at 30 (“Those 
in the free speech narrative are extremely reluctant to concede that racist speech is ever any more 
than offensive speech. . . .”); Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 815 (“It is only 
obtuseness—a failure of perception or empathetic identification—that would enable someone to 
say that the word ‘fascist’ or ‘pig’ produces the same feelings as the word ‘nigger.’  In view of our 
46
epithets based on race, religion, and gender, such as “nigger,” “kike,” and “cunt”171 are 
“merely obnoxious” and not “threatening” ignores the stubborn societal significance of 
these traits and their turbulent histories, including the aforementioned epithets.172  The 
Court’s argument becomes even more confounding when it attempts to compare racial 
discrimination with political affiliation and union membership.  African-Americans—not 
political partisans—were systematically enslaved—“the ultimate violation of human 
dignity.”173   Women—not union members—were denied the right to vote for most of our 
constitutional history.174  And Jews were singularly devastated by the Holocaust.175
Further, race, gender and religion, unlike many other traits, are typically “central to one’s 
self-image.”176  Only someone oblivious to the sting of virulent discrimination—someone 
who had never been called one of the aforementioned epithets—could compare race, 
gender and religion177 to political affiliation or union membership.178  The R.A.V.
history, invective directed against minority groups, and racist speech in general, creates fears of 
violence and subordination that are not plausibly described as mere offense.”).
171
 In using such charged language, I am not unmindful of the risk of  “offending by speaking the 
upsetting words and phrases.”  Greenawalt, supra note 137, at 291.  I use such words nonetheless 
because it seems to me necessary in order to uncover and grapple with “the real issues” embedded 
within the discourse of hate speech regulation.  Id.
172 See generally RANDALL L. KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME 
WORD (2002).
173
 Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 5, at 1135-36.
174 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
175 See Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1781.
176
 Delgado, supra note 12, at 144.
177
 The ordinance also applied to fighting words regarding color, but this trait clearly is related to race.  
Although the ordinance mentioned  “creed” as well, the intended meaning is uncertain.  This term may 
simply be another reference to religious beliefs, much as color is linked with race.  See Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 533 (1986) (defining “creed” as “a brief authoritative doctrinal formula . . . 
intended to define what is held by a Christian congregation, synod, or church to be true . . .” and “a 
formulation or system of religious faith”).  “Creed” has sometimes been used more broadly in a way that 
could embrace political belief, but as explained in the text, the R.A.V. Court interpreted the ordinance not 
to cover political affiliation.
178
 Apparently relying on his own limited experience and viewpoint, Justice Scalia, writing for the 
Court, failed to consider the victim’s perspective.  By contrast, in Roberts, Justice Brennan took 
note of the virulence of gender discrimination, finding that from the victim’s viewpoint, such 
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majority, doggedly resisting context, overlooked the fact that a person discriminated 
against based on her race or gender experiences an injury that cuts to the core of her 
personhood in a way that an insult imposed on account of her political party or union 
affiliation would not.  
A second criticism is that in both cases the Court adopted legal standards 
incompatible with reconciling speech and equality.  The R.A.V. Court erred in subjecting 
the equality-based law to harsh and exacting First Amendment scrutiny.  The Boy Scouts
Court adopted a legal standard that was different in some respects yet also the same.  It 
diluted the showing required of a group asserting a First Amendment exemption from 
antidiscrimination laws so drastically that the evidentiary burden evanesced.  The 
ultimate effect of relieving a First Amendment claimant of any cognizable burden is to 
hobble equality-based laws by riddling them with exceptions whenever an arguable 
conflict with a speech interest is asserted.  Although the R.A.V. Court directed its ire at 
the St. Paul ordinance and the justifications the city offered in support of it, the Court 
simultaneously and discreetly reduced the First Amendment claimant’s burden in finding 
viewpoint-based discrimination on the basis of a solitary and rather flimsy hypothetical.  
In both cases, therefore, the legal standard was calibrated to privilege speech and 
diminish equality.  
Despite the R.A.V. Court’s application of a presumption of unconstitutionality, in 
light of its exceptions to the ban on content-based regulation, the R.A.V. holding, in the 
end, seems to boil down to a determination of legislative motive.  As the Court saw it, the 
discrimination was sufficiently close to racial discrimination.  See Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683-88 (1973) 
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (arguing that gender discrimination is comparable to racial 
discrimination).
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ordinance was not simply content-based; it was also viewpoint-based.179  This is a grave 
charge, as viewpoint-based laws (when the Court recognizes them as such) are invariably 
struck down.180 In general First Amendment cases, “the Court has been ‘reluctant to 
attribute unconstitutional motives to the state, particularly when a plausible [permissible] 
purpose . . . may be discerned from the face of the statute.’”181  In determining whether 
viewpoint discrimination is afoot, however, the Court’s willingness to look closely at 
legislative motive has varied significantly from case to case.182  On the one hand, in 
United States v. O’Brien,183 the Court declined to consider legislative motive.  On the 
other hand, this refusal is inconsistent with the Court’s emphasis on motive in other 
cases, most notably in the flag burning cases, Texas v. Johnson184 and United States v. 
Eichman.185  The aggressive approach employed in the flag burning cases was warranted 
because the context clearly suggested that viewpoint discrimination was operating,186 the 
law served no non-expressive purpose, such as protecting life, liberty or property,187 and 
the law was directed at speech critical of the government, the suppression of which 
179 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (“The First Amendment does not 
permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored 
subjects.”); id. at 395 (“The statements of St. Paul in this very case afford ample basis for, if not 
full confirmation of, [the suspicion of official suppression of ideas].”).  
180 See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-1, at 790.  
181 Id. at 817 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983)).  
182 See id. at 818-19.
183
 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
184
 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
185 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
186
 The federal flag burning law was enacted in the aftermath of the Court’s controversial opinion striking 
down a Texas flag burning statute.  See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 314.  While the federal law may be viewed as 
an attempt to remedy the flaw in the Texas statute, it also evinces an attempt to accomplish the same 
unconstitutional purpose in a craftier manner.
187
 The statute prohibited private persons from destroying their own private property (a flag), despite the 
absence of any tangible non-speech harms arising from that destruction.
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constitutes a unique threat to core First Amendment principles.188  But the Court’s far-
reaching approach, most clearly demonstrated by Eichman,189 should have no place 
where on its face a law protects a vulnerable subset of citizens—rather than the 
government itself190—and seeks to redress concrete harms such as a disproportionate 
exposure to violence and intimidation.191  Although equality-based laws may impact 
speech interests, as argued above, because of their special status under the Equal 
Protection Clause, equality-based laws ought to enjoy a presumption that the legislature 
enacted them in good faith.192  These cases show that the presence of a First Amendment 
claim in R.A.V. did not ineluctably lead the Court to apply an exacting legal standard.  
The Court was faced with a choice, and it selected the most daunting First Amendment 
standard—one that left little room for accommodating equality.  Even the Court’s 
188 See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 415.  Justice Ginsburg made this point during oral argument in Virginia 
v. Black.  See Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack By Justice Thomas on Cross Burning, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2002, at A1 (“Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg objected that there was a ‘big difference’ between 
[flag burning and cross burning].  ‘The flag is a symbol of the government.’  But burning a cross means 
‘attacking people, threatening life and limb,’ she said.”).  Despite this distinction, Justice Ginsburg 
ultimately dissented in Black.  
189
 In Johnson, a viewpoint preference appeared on the face of the Texas statute in that it banned 
desecration “meant to ‘deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will 
seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action.’”  Eichman, 496 U.S. at 313 
(quoting Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989)).  By contrast, in Eichman, “the Flag Protection Act 
contain[ed] no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct,” id. at 315, and it took 
more work for the Court to uncover the viewpoint bias at the heart of the statute.
190 Cf. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (distinguishing the fighting words doctrine because “[n]o 
reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson’s generalized expression of dissatisfaction with 
the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange 
fisticuffs”).
191 Cf. Harel & Parchomovsky, supra note 68, at 526 (“Just as the greater obligation of the parent to protect 
her child should not be perceived as discriminatory, so too the greater obligation of the state to protect its 
more vulnerable members should not be described as such.”).
192 Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003) (“‘[G]ood faith’ on the part of a 
university is ‘presumed’ absent a ‘showing to the contrary.’”) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Ca. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-319 (1978)); Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 825 
(“[C]ross-burning, swastikas, and the like are an especially distinctive kind of ‘fighting word’—
distinctive because of the objective and subjective harm they inflict on their victims and on society 
in general.  An incident of cross-burning can have large and corrosive social consequences.  A 
reasonable and sufficiently neutral government could decide that the same is not true for a hateful 
attack on someone’s parents, union affiliation, or political convictions.”)  (emphasis added).  
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aggressive, exhaustive search for unconstitutional intent,193 however, did not yield 
convincing results.  
Although some scholars have credited the Court’s fears about viewpoint 
discrimination in R.A.V.,194 a closer examination reveals them to be far less plausible.  
The R.A.V. majority explained that in “practical operation,” the St. Paul ordinance would 
have nefarious effects.195  The Court’s sole illustration of such effects follows:
 ‘[F]ighting words’ that do not themselves invoke race, color, 
creed, religion, or gender—aspersions upon a person’s mother, for 
example—would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of 
those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, 
but could not be used by those speakers’ opponents.  One could 
hold up a sign saying, for example, that all anti-Catholic bigots are 
misbegotten; but not that all ‘papists’ are, for that would insult and 
provoke violence ‘on the basis of religion.’196
Thus viewed, the ordinance would handicap one side of a debate on race, gender, or 
religion, while licensing the other to “fight freestyle.”197
This argument simply does not hold up under close analysis.  For starters, the vast 
majority of insults would be permitted or disallowed for both sides of the debate.  Hence, 
an African-American civil rights advocate could not disparage white people based on 
race any more than a white racist could demean African-Americans qua African-
Americans.198  The Court posits that in a showdown between Catholics and anti-
Catholics, the Catholics, in disparaging their opponents, could refer to them as “anti-
193 See Kagan, supra note 19, at 877 (“[T]he viewpoint discrimination found in the ordinance 
existed not on its face, but only in application—and even in application, only with a fair bit of 
argument.”). 
194 Cf., e.g., id. at 878 (suggesting that R.A.V.’s viewpoint neutrality holding has “at its core much 
good sense and reason”).
195 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).  
196 Id. at 392.  
197 Id.
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Catholics,” but in responding, the anti-Catholics could not refer to their opponents as 
“Catholics” because that would run afoul of the ordinance.199  When a speaker chooses to 
attack an entire group (which, of course, is not always the case) such as “anti-Catholic 
bigots,” the response is not always neatly symmetrical, as the Justices appear to think.200
This implicitly rational conception of debate is detached from the messy and sometimes 
arbitrary nature of street brawls.201  Against the backdrop of an almost infinite array of 
retorts targeting either an individual or a group and not necessarily tracking the original 
insult, the claim that the ordinance violates the First Amendment because it requires a 
hypothetical speaker who wishes to cast his insult in terms of group membership to say 
“all advocates of religious tolerance” instead of “all Catholics” is a rather slender reed, 
especially if one keeps in mind that the ordinance did not restrict verbal retorts at all.  
Depriving one side of one particular debate of one arrow in his quiver of invectives (the 
ability to create a sign expressing one specific group insult) does not even approach a 
requirement that the speaker “follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”202  At most, this 
measly example might support an as-applied challenge if a government ever applied a 
law in such an odd fashion.  The lonely hypothetical imagined by the Court surely does 
198 See id. at 391 (“Displays containing some words—odious racial epithets, for example—would 
be prohibited to proponents of all views.”).  
199 See id. at 391-92.  Even this assumption is questionable.  Arguably, a reference to “anti-Catholics” 
invokes religion.
200 See id. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court’s reasoning is 
asymmetrical.”).  Both the majority and dissent ignored the fact that the response might not track 
the content of the insult.  For instance, the response to an attack on all anti-Catholics could easily 
be “Shut up, ugly!” or “I’m going to smack you all silly!” as it could be the Court’s posited 
response.  
201 Cf. Watts, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (“The language of the political arena is often vituperative, 
abusive, and inexact.”).
202 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392; see id. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The St. Paul ordinance does not ban 
all ‘hate speech’ . . . .  Rather it only bans a subcategory of the already narrow category of fighting words.  
Such a limited ordinance leaves open and protected a vast range of expression on the subjects of racial, 
religious, and gender equality.”).
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not suffice to invalidate the ordinance on its face.203  It should now be clear that the 
Court’s adoption of a legal standard that establishes a First Amendment violation 
whenever one side of an imaginable debate enjoys a negligible advantage tilts the speech-
equality analysis decidedly in favor of speech.
Just as the R.A.V. Court diluted the threshold for showing viewpoint 
discrimination, the Boy Scouts Court suggested that parties may bypass 
antidiscrimination laws merely by asserting a First Amendment claim.  Boy Scouts
consequently abandons the pretext analysis at the heart of Roberts and central to Equal 
Protection Clause jurisprudence.  The Boy Scouts majority’s analysis of whether one of 
the Boy Scouts’ expressive goals was opposition to homosexuality was a far cry from 
pretext review.  After quoting a statement from the organization’s brief that it “‘teaches 
that homosexual conduct is not morally straight,’”204 the Court announced that it “need 
not inquire further to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to 
homosexuality.”205  As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, this truncated analysis took 
an astoundingly deferential approach.  Whereas in an earlier related case, Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston,206 the Court had underscored its 
“constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole, 
without deference to the trial court,” in order to determine whether petitioners’ activity 
was in fact protected speech,207 in Boy Scouts, the Court deferred to a position in a 
203 See Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 829 (“Viewpoint discrimination is not 
established by the fact that in some hypotheticals, one side has greater means of expression than 
another, at least—this is the critical part—if the restriction on means has legitimate, neutral 
justifications.”).
204 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000) (quoting Brief for Petitioners 39).
205 Id.
206
 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
207 Id. at 567.
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brief.208 The Court’s approach makes no attempt to sift “genuine exercises of the right to 
associate, on the one hand, and sham claims that are simply attempts to insulate 
nonexpressive private discrimination, on the other hand.”209  Permitting any litigant to 
immunize a discriminatory decision with a mere allegation in his brief would indeed  
“render civil rights legislation a nullity.”210  Recognizing the important constitutional 
interest on the other side of the ledger would at a minimum require a meaningful 
examination of the asserted speech interest, although, as I argue below, such an 
examination need not be as stringent and invasive as Justice Stevens contemplates.
Equality considerations require a close examination of asserted First Amendment 
claims in order to determine whether the claimant’s refusal to comply with 
antidiscrimination laws rests on a genuine expressive interest or whether it is using the 
First Amendment to obscure simple prejudice, i.e., whether the First Amendment claim is 
functioning as a pretext for unlawful discrimination.  For instance, in Romer, the Court 
dismissed the state’s asserted non-discriminatory reasons for the constitutional 
amendment uniquely disabling gays and lesbians from seeking protection from state 
government.  In a rather abbreviated and opaque fashion, the Romer majority concluded 
that the asserted state interests were not genuine and that the law actually rested on 
prejudice against gays and lesbians.  The Court explained: “The primary rationale the 
State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens’ freedom of association, and in 
particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious 
objections to homosexuality.  Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to 
208 Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 651.
209 Id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
210 Id.; see also Hutchison, Closet Case, supra note 126, at 135.
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fight discrimination against other groups.”211  Hence, the “primary rationale,” 
importantly, was a First Amendment interest based on associational and religious 
freedoms.  Yet the Court concluded that the “breadth of the amendment is so far removed 
from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.”212   The lack 
of fit between the state’s purported ends and means, the Court said, revealed that the 
state’s justifications were incredulous.213  This rationale is peculiarly at odds with 
Romer’s professed adherence to rational basis review and that minimal standard of 
review’s attendant refusal to require a close fit between ends and means.  A similarly 
skeptical Court in the VMI case, applying intermediate scrutiny, refused to accept at face 
value the state’s asserted interest in educational diversity as a justification for excluding 
women from Virginia Military Institute.214  Here too there was a potential countervailing 
First Amendment interest.  If the University of Michigan has the constitutional authority 
to promote diversity by considering the race of the students it selects, as Grutter tells us, 
it is not clear why Virginia would lack the authority to promote a diverse array of 
educational options, including some single-sex schools.  Perhaps recognizing this 
connection, the VMI Court was careful not to question the pedagogical value of 
diversity,215 but it did determine that—notwithstanding Virginia’s puffery—the case was 
not really about diversity.  Because the state had a long and pathetic history of 
discriminating against women and failed to advance its ostensible interest in diversity in 
an evenhanded fashion, i.e., providing single-sex schools for men and women, the Court 
211 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
212 Id.
213 Id. (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end 
but to make them unequal to everyone else.”).
214 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535-36 (1996).
215 See id. at 535.
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rejected Virginia’s diversity argument.216  Comparable analysis in Boy Scouts would 
have required an independent evaluation of the Boy Scouts’ assertion that it had excluded 
Dale because he created a genuine conflict with the group’s expressive goal, instead of 
reliance on invidious stereotypes, such as the belief that gays are likely to molest young 
boys.217
The Boy Scouts majority erred in diluting the standard for assessing a potential 
First Amendment impairment to, at most, the equivalent of the rational basis standard, 
i.e., an arguable conflict with speech suffices.218  But Justice Stevens’ analysis leans too 
far in the other direction.  He correctly identified the key question: “[W]hether the mere 
inclusion of the person at issue would impose any serious burden, affect in any 
significant way, or be a substantial restraint upon the organization’s shared goals, basic 
goals, or collective effort to foster beliefs.” 219  His application of the standard, however, 
displayed a troubling willingness to second-guess the Boy Scouts’ assertions of its 
expressive goals.  Although a number of the points in his analysis surely have merit, he 
systematically picked off each piece of evidence, clearing the way for his strained, 
overreaching conclusion that: “In short, Boy Scouts of America is simply silent on 
homosexuality.  There is no shared goal or collective effort . . .  at all . . . .”220  He 
entirely dismissed Policy Statements by BSA leaders stating that homosexuality was 
incompatible with scouting or scout leadership because they were made after Dale 
216 See id. at 536-37.
217 See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 15 (noting history of stereotypical thinking that “male 
homosexuals were thought to be pedophiles and perverts”).
218 Cf. Hutchinson, Closet Case, supra note 126, at 96 (finding that an “imagined impact of civil rights 
enforcement” on a speech interest suffices under Boy Scouts).  
219 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 683 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).
220 Id. at 684 (emphasis added).
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brought suit.221  He rejected a 1978 BSA statement against homosexuality because, in his 
view, it was not “unequivocal” in that it was contingent on BSA’s policy not violating the 
law.222  He somehow read this statement to prevent BSA from challenging the 
constitutionality of the New Jersey antidiscrimination law, and to permit it merely to seek 
change through the legislative process, despite any apparent textual basis for this 
distinction.223  He claimed that BSA’s policy statements that “homosexual conduct is 
inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight and 
in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed”224 was beside the point because 
the Scouts never proved that Dale engaged in homosexual conduct, even though it 
requires no imagination to conclude that an “avowed” homosexual has likely engaged in 
homosexual conduct of some sort.  He turned BSA’s words against the organization, 
arguing, among other things, that its policy of referring Scouts to religious leaders was 
inconsistent with any anti-homosexuality policy because some religions permit 
homosexuality.225  Finally, he claimed that BSA “abandoned” its 1991 and 1992 
221 Id. at 674 (finding that post-litigation statements have “little, if any, relevance . . . . [and] [i]n 
any event, they do not bolster BSA’s claim”).  Although viewing such statements with skepticism 
would be warranted given the timing of their issuance, Justice Stevens’ erasure of them was not.
222 Id. at 673.
223 See id.  The statement simply did not address the issue of whether BSA would challenge in 
court an antidiscrimination law that it deemed unconstitutional.  The equivocation thus was largely 
devised by Justice Stevens.  
224 Id. at 676 (emphasis in original).  Justice Stevens’ claim that BSA conceded that it expelled 
Dale because of his sexual orientation rather than because it believed that he had engaged in 
sexual conduct appears to lack record support.  The letter sent to Dale simply stated that the Boy 
Scouts “‘specifically forbid membership to homosexuals.’”  Id. at 645 (quoting Appendix 137); id.
at 676 (stating that Dale was expelled “because of his sexual orientation” without citation to the 
record).  BSA’s statement that it opposed membership for “homosexuals” did not specify whether 
it defined homosexuality by conduct or orientation.
225 Id. at 670 (“[A] number of religious groups do not view homosexuality as immoral or wrong 
and reject discrimination against homosexuals.”).  But cf. id. at 651 (majority opinion) (rejecting 
lower court’s finding that exclusion of Dale was “‘antithetical to the organization’s goals’” 
because “our cases reject this sort of inquiry”).
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repudiations of homosexuality as inconsistent with its expressive goals when it issued a 
1993 statement stating the following:
The Boy Scouts of America has always reflected the 
expectations that Scouting families have had for the 
organization.  We do not believe that homosexuals provide 
a role model consistent with these expectations.  
Accordingly, we do not allow for the registration of 
avowed homosexuals as members or as leaders of the 
BSA.226
Justice Stevens read the 1993 statement to fail because it (1) did not reiterate the 
points made in the 1991 and 1992 statements (thus, he deemed them “abandoned”); and 
(2) because the 1993 statement relied on members’ “expectations” of the organization, 
which he understood as a code word for discrimination instead of a genuine concern for 
the organization’s expressive goals.  His take on the ambiguous 1993 statement certainly 
does not follow inevitably from the text.  Indeed, Justice Stevens’ rush to find 
contradictions and abandonment of past positions reveals his heavy-handed approach to 
BSA’s First Amendment claim.  In the end, one senses that it would have been much 
simpler, cleaner and respectful of speaker autonomy for him to concede an intrusion on 
BSA’s expressive interest, but find that it was slight (because there was no evidence that 
Dale had ever contravened BSA’s view of homosexuality by advocating homosexuality 
in his scouting activities and his mere presence in the Scouts did not by itself convey a 
message of any significance) and ultimately justified by Dale’s countervailing equality 
interest.
Justice Stevens’ intensive parsing of the Boy Scouts’ evidence would condition 
the right to association on a consistent record of clearly expressing the asserted idea.227
226 Id. at 674 (internal quotations omitted).
227 See id. at 676 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“At a minimum, a group seeking to prevail over an 
antidiscrimination law must adhere to a clear and unequivocal view.”).
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Such a requirement is inconsistent with the manner in which real people, and by 
extension organizations, formulate their thoughts and ideas.228  In many instances, a 
person’s thoughts evolve over time and, as her thoughts change, so does her expression.  
Further, much expression is spontaneous and instinctual.  Since any organization is an 
association of multiple individuals whose views will inevitably diverge to some extent, 
demanding perfect clarity and consistency in adhering to an ideal would seem to defeat 
most associational claims.  An organization should not have to cultivate a perfectly 
consistent record of expression over many years—a type of constitutional “due
diligence”—before the Court will recognize its right to take a particular expressive 
position.229  The right to associate for specific purposes and exclude those who would 
undermine such purposes ought not be limited to the Ku Klux Klan and groups whose 
views have been similarly vociferously expressed, notorious and historically consistent.  
Courts certainly should not take claims of expressive interests at face value, as did the 
Boy Scouts majority, but they need not subject such claims to the withering scrutiny 
adopted by the dissent.  The proportionate approach, by contrast, employs an 
intermediate level of scrutiny, a standard that is better suited to balancing the competing 
interests in the speech-equality equation.230
228 Cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995) (“[A] private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining 
multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive 
subject matter of the speech.”); id. (“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition 
of constitutional protection.”).
229 Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 677 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that BSA was “clearly on notice 
by 1990,” given its participation in related earlier cases, that it had a duty to “explain clearly and 
openly why the presence of homosexuals would affect its expressive activities, or to make the 
view of ‘morally straight’ and ‘clean’ taken in its 1991 and 1992 policies a part of the values 
actually instilled in Scouts through the Handbook, lessons, or otherwise”). 
230
 In general, Justice Stevens has expressed skepticism of the value of applying strict presumptions and 
levels of review to speech and equality claims.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 65-66 
(1976) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging that Court’s professed absolute rule against content-based 
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In light of Bowers, and its somewhat similar doctrinal gymnastics, it is tempting 
to dismiss the Boy Scouts majority’s distortion of Roberts as another indication of the 
Court’s devaluation of the strong claim to equality that gays and lesbians should enjoy 
under our Constitution.  Yet after Lawrence v. Texas’ recent overruling of Bowers and—
just as importantly—its eloquent and expansive endorsement of gay equality, this 
interpretation seems less tenable.  A more nuanced explanation is that despite the 
Justices’ increasing willingness to protect gays and lesbians from adverse treatment that 
they view as illegitimate, such claims do not yet enjoy sufficient force to overcome the 
talismanic invocation of the First Amendment that some like Justice Kennedy (author of 
Lawrence and Romer, yet also a member of the Boy Scouts’ majority) have a hard time 
resisting.  Had Dale’s equality interest not run up against a privileged First Amendment 
claim, the majority might have been able to see the discrimination lurking beneath the 
facade of a speech claim.
A final observation relates to the Court’s treatment of context in R.A.V. and Boy 
Scouts.  In this respect, the two cases differ considerably but both disappoint.  As I have 
said, the R.A.V. Court deemed the St. Paul ordinance an instance of viewpoint 
discrimination, which it suggested reflected “the desire of the ‘ins’ to exert their political 
muscle by harming the ‘outs.’”231  In reaching this conclusion, the Court distorted the 
context in which the St. Paul ordinance was enacted in a manner that reveals a tin ear 
indifferent to the cries of people on the bottom.232   The outsider of concern to the Court 
is the political minority—the bigot whose views purportedly have relegated him to the 
regulation should not be understood literally).  Justice Stevens also wisely challenged the majority’s First 
Amendment absolutism in R.A.V. See 505 U.S. at 417.
231
 Greene, supra note 53, at 33-34.  
232 Cf. Kagan, supra note 19, at 877 (“[R]ecognizing viewpoint regulation may well depend on the 
decisionmaker’s viewpoint”).
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fringes of a newly tolerant social milieu—not racial minorities.233  The process theory of 
equal protection review, championed by John Hart Ely234 and signified by the Carolene 
Products footnote four, seeks to protect political minorities, but not the occasional
political loser, such as the racist in R.A.V.  Although a white male may lose out when the 
city passes a hate crime ordinance, he is more likely to be in the majority on many other 
issues.  As a member of the dominant race and gender, he is not subject to the “empathy 
failure” that frequently blocks attempts by people of color, women and gays and lesbians 
to form majority coalitions.  Moreover, while outright appeals to racial hatred may 
marginalize the racist in political discourse, our political history suggests that he might 
enjoy considerable success with more subtle and strategic efforts to use race as a wedge 
issue.  This equality perspective shows that, contrary to the Court’s suggestion,235 racists 
are “not anti-orthodoxy in any sense that incorporates the history and dynamics of race in 
the United States.”236  Although formal equality now enjoys societal consensus, this 
consensus, like formal equality itself, is skin deep.  People of color, although approaching 
majority status in a handful of regions in this country, are many miles from harnessing 
the type of political power that might warrant deeming them an overweening majority 
and thus require judicial intervention to protect their disadvantaged opponents.  Viewed 
in its proper context, the St. Paul ordinance is useful, but a mere drop in the bucket 
233
 “[T]oday’s First Amendment champions tend to see state and local ‘community standards’ of 
discourse as the paradigmatic threat to free speech . . . .”  Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 5, at 
1151.  Further, as Nan Hunter has pointed out, “First Amendment jurisprudence has never fully 
comprehended the role that group identity dynamics played in the seminal case law protecting 
speech, but has rather treated those cases as emerging from disconnected, atomistic encounters 
between a repressive state and dissenting individuals.”  Hunter, supra note 2, at 1672.   
234
 John Hart Ely, Policing the Process of Representation: The Court as Referee, Democracy and Distrust 
(1980), reprinted in Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader, supra note 96, at 3.   
235 See Hunter, supra note 2, at 1711 (noting how in the R.A.V. majority’s eyes “the racist comes 




toward eliminating the structural and material inequalities that persist despite the modest 
success of the civil rights movement.  The Court’s allegiance to the ostensible “political 
minority” in R.A.V. demonstrates both that judges may fall prey to the same “empathy 
failure” that the Equal Protection Clause charges them with averting in the legislatures237
and that acknowledging the equality underpinnings of the St. Paul ordinance might have 
helped the Court avoid this pitfall in its First Amendment analysis. 
Just as it exaggerated the viewpoint discriminatory effects of the ordinance, the 
Court downplayed the persistent inequities that equality-based laws seek to redress.  The 
Court pejoratively suggested that the hate crime ordinance represented nothing more than 
group “favoritism,”238 much as Justice Scalia argued in dissent in Romer that laws 
prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians are “special” protections or 
preferences.239  This decontexualized perspective fails to consider that such laws 
counteract past and present discrimination; they are not gratuitous patronage handed out 
by government solely for political purposes.  This familiar technique, whether employed 
against gays and lesbians or African-Americans, hinges on erasing the reality of 
discrimination against particular outgroups and then positing that any deviation from the 
supposed neutral baseline, such as a hate speech law, is “special,” i.e., unwarranted and 
unfair.  As Cheryl Harris has written:
237 See Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1764-65.
238 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (“The government may not regulate use 
based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”).
239 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 615, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of 
imposing the preferences of the elite); Hutchinson, Closet Case, supra note 126, at 125-26.  The 
Romer Court rejected Justice Scalia’s argument.  It explained: “We find nothing special in the 
protections Amendment 2 withholds.  These are protections taken for granted by most people 
either because they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion 
from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in 
a free society.”  Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
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The law masks what is chosen as natural; it obscures the 
consequences of social selection as inevitable.  The result is that 
distortions in social relations are immunized from truly effective 
intervention, because the existing inequities are obscured and 
rendered nearly invisible.  The existing state of affairs is 
considered neutral and fair, however unequal and unjust it is in 
substance.240
The denial of specific protection to groups that are not covered by hate speech 
laws (such as union members) is unlikely to demonstrate that such groups are true 
political outsiders.  Instead, it normally reflects the fact that unprotected groups have not 
experienced discrimination tantamount to that experienced by protected groups.  
Government is not doling out favors based on political preferences but rather is 
responding to real problems.  Where it reasonably fails to see a problem, it need not 
regulate.  “States adopt laws to address the problems that confront them.  The First 
Amendment does not require States to regulate for problems that do not exist.”241  The 
Court was able to see R.A.V. as an instance of “censorship in its purest form”242 because 
it had shorn the case of its equality dimension, including outsider personal experiences243
and the virulent impact of the burning cross that would later form the basis for the 
240
 Harris, supra note 58, at 1777; see also id. at 1768 (“[C]olorblindness is a form of race 
subordination in that it denies the historical context of white domination and Black 
subordination.”); Hunter, supra note 2, at 1711 (“The R.A.V. result can be seen to exemplify the 
claim that seemingly neutral rules operate to reinforce bias, by distorting social reality and 
ignoring power imbalances.”).  
241 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992) (plurality opinion).
242 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 430.
243
 For instance, the Court’s terse statement of the facts obscured the fact that the cross burning in 
R.A.V. was part of a broader racially-motivated campaign to drive an African-American family 
from the predominantly white neighborhood it was attempting to integrate.  “In the spring of 1990 
[the Jones family] had moved into [its] four-bedroom, three-bathroom dream house in St. Paul, 
Minnesota.  They were the only black family on the block.  Two weeks after they had settled into 
their predominantly white neighborhood, the tires on both their cars were slashed.  A few weeks 
later one of their car windows was shattered, and a group of teenagers walked past their house and 
shouted ‘nigger’ at their nine-year-old son.”  Matsuda & Lawrence, supra note 14, at 133.
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Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black.244  Only by overlooking the historical patterns of 
discrimination, which are central in equal protection analysis,245 and which explain the 
distinction between protected and unprotected groups, could the Court portray the St. 
Paul ordinance as perverse.  
In the Boy Scouts case, the Court was more attentive to context, but its analysis 
was superficial.  Its passive reflection of societal prejudice in evaluating the social 
meaning of gay presence and the expressive function of “coming out” created tension 
with the Court’s equality jurisprudence.  The Court concluded that “Dale’s presence in 
the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to 
the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a 
legitimate form of behavior.”246  The Court did not claim that Dale had engaged in gay 
advocacy directed at scouts or anyone else during Boy Scouts activities, would do so in 
the future or had engaged in any flamboyant behavior revealing his sexual orientation at 
such activities.247  Nonetheless, the Court analogized Dale to a person in a parade who 
wears a liberatory banner,248 and the state’s attempt to force the Scouts to embrace such 
an activist to the state effort invalidated by the Court in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston.249  There are two steps in this analysis.  The 
Court concluded that (1) It would be evident to the world that Dale is gay; and (2) Dale’s 
244 See id. at 134 (citing R.A.V.’s “completely ahistorical and acontextual” approach as “exactly the kind of 
legal analysis this book is intended to counter”)
245
 Whether the group has experienced a history of discrimination is one prong of the Carolene Products
formulation for determining whether a group should be treated as a suspect class.  See Yoshino, Suspect 
Symbols, supra note 145, at 1773.
246 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
247 See id. at 690 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
248 See id. at 653-54.
249
 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995).
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mere presence in the Scouts, as a homosexual who had come out in another context,
would indicate that the Boy Scouts approved of his sexual orientation or conduct.  
It is difficult to see how Dale’s mere presence at Boy Scouts functions would 
necessarily broadcast a message about homosexuality or indicate that the Boy Scouts 
endorsed any such message.  To some extent, the first conclusion does not resonate with 
gay experience from the perspective of the “bottom.”  The Court misapprehended the 
complex texture and meaning of “coming out,” overlooking outsider experiences as it did 
in R.A.V.  As far as we know, Dale’s only public acts evincing his sexual orientation 
were accepting a position as copresident of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance
and speaking out about the “the psychological and health needs of lesbian and gay 
teenagers” at a Rutgers event that was covered by a newspaper.250  The newspaper 
published a photograph of Dale and identified him as a leader in the student 
organization.251  Unless the Court embraced the hoary stereotype of a flamboyant, 
essentialized homosexual whose sexuality is incapable of being concealed,252 its 
assumption of widespread knowledge must have rested on a belief that once the cat of 
Dale’s sexuality was out of the bag it spread quickly throughout the community.  
Although the newspaper article made it possible that people, including those in 
the Boy Scouts, would learn of Dale’s sexual orientation, the effect of the publication 
should not be overstated.  As Kenji Yoshino has explained:
Gays can never be out and done with it; they must 
continually reiterate their sexual orientation against a 
250 See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 645.
251 See id.
252 Given that stereotyping is the fulcrum of much equal protection analysis, see, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 
123 S.Ct. 2325, 2339, 2341-42 (2003); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 565 (1996); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604 
(1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), overruled in part by, Adarand, 497 U.S. at 227), one hopes that the Court 
did not rest on this troubling stereotype.  
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heterosexist presumption that reinstates itself at every 
pause.  The most damaging failure of the closet symbol is 
perhaps that it misrepresents the continuum of a person’s 
disclosure of his or her homosexual orientation as a binary 
constructed from the endpoints of that continuum.  One is 
either “out” or “closeted”: the closet with its rigid door 
between the “outside” and the “inside” does not lend itself 
to subtler gradations.253
Even gays and lesbians who have asserted their sexual orientation publicly may find that, 
because of the strong heterosexist presumption, certain associates—straight and gay—
wrongly assume that they are heterosexual.  Outing is a continual and volitional process 
and one that requires delicate judgment and negotiation, including consideration of the 
very real risk that speaking one’s sexual identity will lead to exclusion and alienation.254
As a result, there would be nothing unusual in Dale being openly gay in the college 
context where he found support in a gay student organization but shrouding that identity 
in the less hospitable environment of the Scouts.255
The Court’s finding of a First Amendment violation rests not only on an 
assumption of widespread community knowledge of Dale’s sexual orientation but also on 
the further assumption that the community would interpret Dale’s continued inclusion in 
the Boy Scouts as signifying the Scouts’ endorsement of homosexual conduct.  In 
contrast to R.A.V.’s tacit erasure of the discrimination that justified the St. Paul 
ordinance, this particular Boy Scouts  conclusion, oddly, seems to overestimate the extent 
of societal discrimination against gays.  This overestimation is consistent with the Court’s 
253
 Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1811.
254 See, e.g., Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness, supra note 126, at 89 (“[T]he stigma attached to non-
heterosexual sexual practice renders coming out for ‘sexual others’ a complex, delicate, threatening, and 
often dangerous event.”).
255 See Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145 at 1813 (“A court that regards the ‘public’ as monolithic, 
such that a single disclosure by a gay person of his or her homosexuality can be seen as potentially leaving 
that person’s homosexual identity open to all, puts additional pressure on gays to keep their identities
totally secret.”).
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exaggeration of the public curiosity in the sexual orientation of a non-celebrity such as 
Dale, which seems implicit in its assumption that the newspaper article would lead to 
Dale’s sexual orientation becoming widely known throughout the community.  
As to the endorsement point, a large and unselective organization’s mere 
admission of a person does not normally imply its embrace of that individual’s private 
sexual conduct or ideological activity carried on outside the scope of the organization’s 
auspices.256  Antidiscrimination law compels an employer to refrain from discriminating, 
and any reasonable observer knows that.  Ever since the civil rights movement, 
employment decisions have been tightly regulated at the state and federal levels.  Even if 
one assumes—contrary to the normal legal presumption—a society in which the public is 
unaware of basic civil rights laws, at most a reasonable observer could interpret the 
employer’s or group’s failure to exclude a homosexual that engages in no homosexual 
advocacy during the organization’s functions as a sign that the employer tolerates 
homosexual employees.  But, as many gay and lesbian people have had to learn, 
tolerance—in the sense of holding your nose at or being deliberately indifferent to 
someone’s personal conduct—is several steps from endorsing or celebrating that person’s 
private decisions or identity.257  Thus, there must be something specifically about gay 
identity or conduct that, in the Court’s mind, distinguishes it from other forms of identity 
or conduct and that ultimately justified excluding Dale. 
Although the Court did not articulate this point expressly, the difference appears 
to be that Dale was not simply someone with a homosexual orientation but someone who 
had chosen to come out of the closet and affiliate with a gay and lesbian organization.  As 
256
 As Justice Stevens argued, “The notion that an organization of [the Boy Scouts’] size and 
enormous prestige implicitly endorses the views that each of those adults may express in a non-
Scouting context is simply mind boggling.”  Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 697.
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the Court repeatedly said,258 Dale was an “avowed” homosexual.  This feature of the 
case—that Dale’s equality interest was deeply intertwined with his decision to speak his 
identity—makes Boy Scouts a uniquely difficult case.  I do not contend that the answer is 
clear-cut even under the proportionate approach.  Justice’s Stevens’ argument that the 
Boy Scouts’ exclusion of Dale was pretextual because the Scouts did not oust straight 
members who advocated gay openness and equality is not quite dispositive because a 
straight member cannot “come out.”  A straight Scout’s revelation of his sexual 
orientation contains minimal social meaning because the expression simply confirms the 
heterosexist norm.  By contrast, a gay person has the option to come out, and this 
expressive act undeniably adds force and meaning to the abstract advocacy of gay 
openness.  Therefore, the Court may have viewed coming out as a political act, as a 
volitional259 statement about gay openness and equality that justified Dale’s exclusion.
Given that politically tinged comings-out are the most visible and paradigmatic, it would 
not be surprising if this most expressive manner of revealing one’s sexual orientation 
preoccupied the Justices.  
A fuller understanding of gay and lesbian experiences again provides a response 
that reveals the question to be closer than the Court may have assumed.260  Although the 
term “coming out” is most commonly understood to contain political implications,261 at 
its root, it need not mean anything more than telling the truth or refusing to lie about the 
257 Cf. Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1792.
258 See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 644, 655-56.
259
 Coming out is not wholly volitional in that strong emotional convictions often impel a person to disclose 
her sexual identity.  
260 See Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1833 (noting that “those who are empowered to 
regulate an identity are not necessarily those who know even its fundamental characteristics”). 
261 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 19, at 2439-40, 2443 (describing “coming out” as “an act of community 
through which the uncloseted individual both joins a subculture and becomes an ambassador at large of that 
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fact of one’s orientation or romantic relationships.  For some gays and lesbians, including 
many in the African-American gay community, that is all it means.  “Coming out” in this 
sense does not entail marching in parades or becoming politically active.262  In fact, many 
openly gay people would never partake in such activities because they do not understand 
their sexual orientation as requiring alignment with a particular political agenda.  An 
intersectionality perspective tells us that a person is not simply homosexual but also, for 
instance, Latino or Asian-American, man or woman, Republican or independent, Catholic 
or Muslim, politically active or apolitical.  These additional and overlapping group 
identities often mitigate the extent to which a homosexual chooses to identify with a gay 
movement that is predominantly white, male and politically liberal.  Thus, saddling all 
gay and lesbian people who are honest about their sexual orientation with a presumption 
that they are engaged in political expression would be overbroad.
Although initially one might think that the fact that Dale was discriminated 
against not solely based on his sexual orientation but also because of his choice to speak 
his identity justifies his exclusion, this intuition may not be sound.  The speech 
component of Dale’s interest might actually buttress his claim.  Clearly, the Boy Scouts 
discriminated against Dale based on the content of his expression.  If he had said that he 
was straight, he would not have had to leave the Scouts.  Further, although the Boy 
Scouts invoked its right of association, Dale was being punished for associating with a 
gay and lesbian campus organization, and the ultimate result of a legal rule that reinforces 
the already immense pressure to remain in the closet might be a society without ACT UP 
subculture as well”); Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness, supra note 126, at 122-23 (“Coming out is . . . a 
form of political action”).
262
 Scholarly attempts to conflate sexual identity and political expression by arguing that they are 
“inextricably linked,” e.g., Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness, supra note 126, at 116, although 
understandable, appear to essentialize.  
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and the Log Cabin Republicans, which would diminish pluralism.263  “Threats to ‘free 
speech’ may come as readily from private power (which is itself created by public power) 
as from the actions of the state.”264  Although private silencing is not normally thought to 
pose a First Amendment problem,265 here the Court legitimated, reinforced and inscribed 
into law the Scouts’ content-based discrimination.266   The Court was willing to recognize 
Dale’s claim to equal treatment only insofar as he was willing to sacrifice his right freely 
to express his sexual orientation.267  This is, in essence, a constitutional version of “Don’t 
Ask; Don’t Tell.”268  Those who reject the constitutional nature of private power’s threat 
to speech values may not be convinced by this argument.  The claim, however, finds 
support in the Court’s equality cases and in the one equality-speech case that forthrightly 
balanced equality and speech, Roberts.
Whereas due process jurisprudence serves largely to reflect historically rooted 
values and confirm societal consensus, the Equal Protection Clause possesses more 
263 See Eskridge, supra note 19, at 2443 (noting how the closet “disabled gay people from forming social 
and political groups”).
264
 Sullivan, supra note 1, at 105-06; see Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 950 (1963) (discussing First Amendment concerns raised by “private 
centers of power [that] have come to possess extensive authority over the welfare of their individual 
members,” such as “labor unions, business associations, [and] professional societies”); see also Eskridge, 
supra note 19, at 2448 (“Gay experience resists making so much of the public-private distinction.”).
265 But see Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (“There is no sanctuary in the First 
Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all.”).
266
 Because there were dueling speech interests, the very formulation of the Court’s rule, which predicated 
Dale’s inclusion on his remaining silent without providing any neutral justification for that decision or even 
acknowledging the choice undergirding its decision, officially validated one side of a private debate.  Cf.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (stating that suit between private individuals may 
raise First Amendment concerns); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-15, 19-20 (1948) (concluding that 
judicial enforcement of discriminatory action violates the Fourteenth Amendment).  
267 See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 696 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
Court’s holding because “[Dale’s] openness is the sole and sufficient justification for his ostracism.”).  
268 Cf. David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment 
Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 319 (1994).  
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radical aspirations.269  Equal protection analysis does not accept social conventions as 
they are but rather asks with a critical gaze whether such conventions entrench a caste-
like system.270  For instance, rather than acquiescing in a system that superficially 
privileges women by, for example, punishing only young men who drink and drive,271 the 
Court has delved into the stereotypical underpinnings of such laws and self-consciously 
uprooted them.272  The same equality perspective that upset the “pedestal/cage”273 and 
paved the way for Roberts calls for a skeptical view of the closet. 
In many respects, the closet is the defining construct of gay identity, providing the 
gateway to personal autonomy and acceptance or to furious repression and self-hatred.274
Although there are important differences, the internalized psychological damage inflicted 
by the closet is not unlike the stigmatic harm that animated Brown v. Board of 
Education.275  The equality argument does not dissolve merely because Dale could have 
hidden his identity and instead “voluntarily” chose to come out of the closet at college.  
Certainly, we would not require a Jewish person to avoid statements indicating her 
religious faith in order to escape discrimination.276  Conversely, we might require a 
person with a medical condition to utilize medical assistance that would mitigate the 
disability rather than claim disability discrimination.277  The difference between these two 
269 See Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1773-74.  But see Eskridge, supra note 121 (arguing 
that courts have deployed due process and equal protection analysis in a more complex and compatible 
manner).
270 See Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1773-74 (stating that Equal Protection Clause 
“protects against traditions, however long-standing and deeply rooted”).
271 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
272 See Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1776, 1779-80.
273 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).
274 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 19, at 2442; Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1794, 1797.
275
 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
276 See Eskridge, supra note 19, at 2418-19.
277 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1999).
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scenarios is a substantive judgment about the value of religion and modern medicine, 
respectively.  The Boy Scouts case likewise should have forced the Court to think about 
the closet and its impact on gays and lesbians and the extent to which the Justices should 
legitimate a rule that coerces gays and lesbians to remain in the closet.278
Notwithstanding the damaging effects of the closet in general, a look at 
the particular facts of the Boy Scouts case, which the proportionate approach 
requires, may dampen the persuasive force of Dale’s claim.  If Dale had been 
fired from his job or if the Boy Scouts was clearly a commercial organization, his 
claim would have been more closely analogous to Roberts as well as more firmly 
rooted in the anti- caste principle.  Dale’s reliance on the Scouts’ provision of 
“important socialization skills, [a] chance to connect with peers and society 
through community service, and basic outlets for fun and support” seems less 
compelling to the extent such socialization is not tethered to commercial 
advancement279 and there are alternatives avenues of social development for gays 
and lesbians.  The proportionate approach seeks to balance speech and equality in 
order to preserve the pluralism and diversity of society, a First Amendment and 
equality interest.  In general, purely social groups would seem to be closer to the 
private, protected end of the spectrum than the commercial end where First 
Amendment protection is at its weakest.280  The proper holding in Boy Scouts
thus may boil down to unresolved factual questions: whether the Boy Scouts is 
purely social or whether special characteristics of the Scouts distinguish it from 
278 Cf. Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1774.
279 See Brief for Respondent at 37, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
280
 As the Court has explained, “[d]etermining the limits of state authority over an individual’s freedom to 
enter into a particular association . . . unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship’s 
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other social organizations.  For instance, key factors might include the extent to 
which the Boy Scouts are intertwined with government, which might heighten the 
stigma of excluding gays, and the degree to which the organization is commercial 
in nature or functions as an avenue to socioeconomic advancement.281  This anti-
caste inquiry, whatever its ultimate result, is conspicuously absent from Dale.282
At the end of the day, the Justices in the majority failed to stop and “consider 
[their] potential complicity in the oppression” of the closet, which equality 
considerations required them to examine.283
C. Virginia v. Black: The Court Returns to the Middle
Despite the Court’s practice of privileging speech over equality, the Court’s 
recent decision in Virginia v. Black signals a return to the middle, particularly when 
placed in the context of a term that saw unusual landmark victories for people of color,284
women,285 and gays and lesbians.286  Honestly facing the collision between speech and 
equality, the Black Court rendered a decision substantially revising the reasoning in 
R.A.V. and striving to accommodate both constitutional interests.  Although 
objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal 
attachments.”  Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 623, 620 (1984).
281 See, e.g., id. at 633-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(“[T]here is only minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of commercial association.”).
282
 The Court chose not discuss these issues even though Dale asserted that the Boy Scouts is a commercial 
organization and is intertwined with government.  See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 2-3, 12 n.8, 39, Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699) (“BSA is in many respects . . . a commercial 
entity.”).  
283
 Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1775, 1788.
284 See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2339; Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (2003) (plaintiff-friendly
interpretation of Title VII).
285 Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972 (2003) (holding that pattern of gender-
based discrimination justified Family and Medical Leave Act’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity).
286 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).  Despite my reductive characterization of these cases for 
rhetorical purposes, they of course benefited more than just one discrete group.  For instance, Title VII 
(Desert Palace) protects women as well as people of color.
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unfortunately it did not expressly rely on the Fourteenth Amendment, several features of 
the Court’s analysis indicate that the decision represents a significant departure from the 
Court’s equality-neglecting recent past.  
Black represents a substantial change in approach not just for the Court but also 
for some of the individual Justices who helped form the R.A.V. majority, most notably 
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia.  Moreover, the change appears to reflect Justice 
Thomas’ decision to inject his personal experiences with racist oppression into the 
Justices’ deliberative process.  Whatever the precise catalyst, the resulting opinion, by 
Justice O’Connor, the most centrist Justice, pays close attention to context and history 
and rightly rejects the near-absolutism of R.A.V.287
Virginia v. Black arose from two separate cross burnings implicating three 
different defendants.  In May 1998, three people burned a cross on the yard of an 
African-American family in Virginia Beach, Virginia.  The cross burning was intended as 
retaliation for the father James Jubilee’s complaint about defendant Richard Elliott’s 
shooting firearms in Elliott’s backyard.288   Jubilee testified that, upon finding the 
remains of the cross in his yard, he became extremely anxious, knowing that “a cross 
burned in your yard . . . tells you that it’s just the first round.”289  A few months later, 
Barry Black led a Ku Klux Klan rally on the property of a person affiliated with the Klan 
287 See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2338 (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (warning against applying 
constitutional rules “out of context” and the “concrete situations that gave rise to [the claims]”); id.
(urging courts to “carefully examin[e] the importance and sincerity of the reasons advanced by the 
governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context”).  Speech also must be 
assessed in its particular context.  See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“The meaning of any expression and the legitimacy of its regulation can only be 
determined in context.”); see also TRIBE, supra note 7, at 831 (“The very notion of speech is, of 
course, incomprehensible outside a cultural and social context.”).  
288 See Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1542-43.
289 Id. at 1543.
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in rural Virginia.290  After speeches vilifying African-Americans, Latinos and Bill and 
Hillary Clinton, someone burned a cross.  When a sheriff approached Black, he accepted 
responsibility for the cross burning.291
Virginia prosecuted the defendants for violating its cross-burning statute, which 
provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the 
intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to 
burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of 
another, a highway or other public place.  Any person who 
shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of 
a Class 6 felony. Any such burning of a cross shall be 
prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or 
group of persons.292
Both Black and Elliott were convicted by juries, but the jury instructions 
in their trials differed significantly.  In Black’s case, the judge instructed the jury 
(over Black’s objection): “‘the burning of a cross by itself is sufficient evidence 
from which you may infer the required intent.’”293  The jury at Elliott’s trial, by 
contrast, did not hear that instruction.294  The third defendant, Jonathan O’Mara, 
pleaded guilty.295  A divided Virginia Supreme Court held that the state’s cross 
burning statute was in conflict with R.A.V., which it considered “analytically 
indistinguishable.”296
290 See id. at 1542.
291 See id.
292
 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1996).
293
 123 S.Ct. at 1542 (quoting unpublished state court decision in appendix).
294 See id. at 1543.
295 See id.
296
 262 Va. 764 (2001).
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The Supreme Court was also divided, yet in important respects it upheld 
the cross burning statute.  After reciting R.A.V.’s general ban on content-based 
discrimination, Justice O’Connor297 went on to find that the cross-burning statute 
fit into an R.A.V. exception.  Pursuant to the exception for laws that are “based on 
the very reasons why the particular class of speech at issue ... is proscribable,”298
the Court held, “[t]he First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings 
done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent 
form of intimidation.”299  Justice Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice 
Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the case was very similar to R.A.V. and that the 
majority’s “variation” of R.A.V. was not “acceptable.”300  In both cases, Justice 
Souter contended, the state was attempting to suppress ideas.301  Justice Thomas 
dissented on substantially different grounds,302 which are discussed below.
A plurality of the Court ruled that the prima facie evidence provision, as 
interpreted by the model jury instruction, was unconstitutional.303  This provision, 
Justice O’Connor concluded, “strips away the very reason why a State may ban 
cross burning with the intent to intimidate . . . permit[ting] the Commonwealth to 
arrest, prosecute, and convict a person based solely on the fact of cross burning 
297
 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer joined Justice 
O’Connor in this portion of her opinion.
298
 123 S.Ct. at 1549.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 1559 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1561 (describing the majority opinion as “treating 
R.A.V.’s virulence exception in a more flexible, pragmatic manner than [R.A.V.’s] original illustrations 
would suggest”).  
301 See id. at 1560.  
302 See id. at 1563 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
303
 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer joined Justice O’Connor in this 
portion of her opinion.
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itself.”304  The statute thus “ignores all the contextual factors” necessary to assess 
the extent to which a cross burning is protected expression.305  It blurred the 
critical distinction between cross burning intended solely as political expression 
(such as at a Klan rally not in the presence of African-Americans) and the same 
act directed at particular individuals such as the Jubilee family.306  Justice 
O’Connor indicated that incidental offense or resentment that onlookers may 
experience in seeing a Klan cross burning not intended to intimidate would not 
suffice to treat the cross burning as a constitutionally-proscribable fighting 
word.307  Despite her criticism of the prima facie evidence provision and the 
model jury instruction, Justice O’Connor left the door open for the state courts to 
cure this problem in the future, perhaps by severing the provision or construing it 
differently.308  Consequently, the Court affirmed the Virginia Supreme Court only 
as to Black (whose trial was infected with the erroneous jury instruction), but 
vacated the lower court decision as to Elliott and O’Mara.309
304 Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1550-51. 
305 Id. at 1551.
306 See id.  Citing cross burnings depicted in films such as Mississippi Burning,  the Court noted 
that some cross burnings are intended neither to express political ideology nor intimidate a victim.  
See id.
307 See id.
308 See id. at 1552.
309 See id.  Justice Scalia, joined in large part by Justice Thomas, wrote an opinion concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part.  Justice Scalia objected to Justice 
O’Connor’s interpretation of the prima facie evidence provision and the jury instruction.  See id. at 
1552 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Scalia concluded that Justice 
O’Connor was misapplying overbreadth doctrine and that the class of people with legitimate 
speech interests whose expression might be chilled was far too small to support a facial challenge 
to the statute.  See id. at 1555-56.  Because the flaw in Black’s conviction arose from the jury 
instruction and not the statute itself, Justice Scalia (unlike the plurality) would have permitted the 
state to retry Black.
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In many respects, Justice O’Connor’s Black opinion reflects the principles 
of Justice White’s R.A.V opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice 
O’Connor joined.  Whereas the R.A.V. Court said next to nothing about the 
history of racism, sexism and religious discrimination and proceeded as if “we 
know nothing about the origins of the practice of cross burning or about the 
meaning that a burning cross carries both for those who use it and for those whom 
it terrorizes,”310  Justice O’Connor in Black carefully explicated “cross burning’s 
long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence,”311 which is 
consistent with Justice White’s opinion.312  Rather than treat the burning cross as 
the subject of majority disfavor, Justice O’Connor made it plain why government 
would want to ban cross burning: “From the inception of the second [Ku Klux] 
Klan, cross burnings have been used to communicate both threats of violence and 
messages of shared ideology,” which is “‘the faithful maintenance of White 
Supremacy.’”313  The Klan used cross burnings to send messages such as “We are 
here to keep the niggers out of your town,” and the threat to “cut a few throats” in 
order to “shut the Jews up.”314  “These incidents of cross burning, among others, 
helped prompt Virginia to enact its first version of the cross-burning statute in 
1950.”315
310
 Matsuda & Lawrence, supra note 14, at 135.
311
 123 S.Ct. at 1549 (opinion of O’Connor, J.).
312 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 407 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).  
313





In light of this history, Justice O’Connor concluded, the burning cross has 
“special force.”316  Its importance and virulence as a threat can be fully 
understood only when placed in its proper historical context.317  In R.A.V., Justice 
White, joined by Justice O’Connor, relied on history and context in arguing that 
the majority misapprehended its own exception.  In important respects, Justice 
White’s opinion “echoes the critique made by critical race theorists.”318  He 
wrote: “The ordinance falls within the first exception to the majority’s theory” 
because the city has identified race, religion, and gender because of  “our Nation’s 
long and painful experience with discrimination.”319   The ordinance was directed 
at a “class of speech that conveys an overriding message of personal injury and 
imminent violence . . .  a message that it at its ugliest when directed against 
groups that have been the targets of discrimination.”320  Justice Stevens, who 
joined part of Justice White’s opinion, added that the “cross burning in this case—
directed as it was to a single African-American family trapped in their home—
was nothing more than a crude form of physical intimidation.”321  He further 
castigated the majority for contradicting itself in permitting Congress to ban 
threats against the President “because those threats are particularly likely to cause 
316 Id.
317 See Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2366 (“There are certain symbols and regalia 
that in the context of history carry a clear message of racial supremacy, hatred, persecution, and 
degradation of certain groups.  The swastika, the Klan robes, the burning cross are examples—like 
all signs—that have no meaning on their own, but that convey a powerful message to both the user 
and the recipient of the sign in context.”).
318
 Matsuda & Lawrence, supra note 14, at 135.
319
 505 U.S. at 407 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
320 Id. at 408.  
321 Id. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  
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‘fear of violence,’ ‘disruption,’ and actual ‘violence.’”322  “Precisely this same 
reasoning  . . . compels the conclusion that St. Paul’s ordinance is 
constitutional.”323
The Black majority corrected R.A.V.’s misapplication of the virulence 
exception.  Just as the Court had concluded in R.A.V. that the statute barring 
threats of violence against the President came within an exception because the 
reasons why threats are not protected by the First Amendment have “special 
force” as applied to the President,324 the Black majority concluded that the 
reasons behind a ban on cross burning similarly possess special force.  Whereas 
the R.A.V. majority fixated on the supposedly “nefarious” effects of the St. Paul 
ordinance, the Black majority was concerned about the “pernicious” history of 
cross burning.
Black disappoints, however, insofar as Justice O’Connor relied on 
R.A.V.’s suggestion that government cannot protect people of color, women and 
religious minorities without also protecting political partisans, union members and 
others to purge the taint of content-based discrimination.  This was precisely the 
requirement Justice O’Connor protested in R.A.V. when she signed onto Justice 
White’s opinion.325  In Black, Justice O’Connor distinguished R.A.V. by stating: 
“Virginia does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward 
‘one of the disfavored topics’ . . .  .  It does not matter whether an individual burns 
322 Id. at 424.
323 Id.
324
 505 U.S. at 388-89.
325 See id. at 402 (White, J. concurring in the judgment) (attacking the Court’s “First Amendment 
underinclusiveness” holding); id. (stating that the majority’s perceived purported defect in St. Paul 
ordinance could be cured by adding “and all other fighting words that may constitutionally be 
subject to this ordinance”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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a cross with intent to intimidate because of the victim’s race, gender, or religion, 
or because of the victim’s ‘political affiliation, union, or homosexuality.”326
Further, Justice O’Connor said, “as a factual matter it is not true that cross burners 
direct their intimidating conduct solely to racial minorities.”327
This much is true.  But what does it prove?  The same could be said of the 
St. Paul ordinance.  It would ban the brandishing of a swastika aimed at a person 
who appeared to be Jewish even if in fact she were not Jewish, so long as the 
display aroused resentment either directly (because of a Jewish bystander) or 
vicariously (the non-Jewish target being offended on behalf of Jews).  Although 
in both instances the laws might have occasionally protected members of 
nonsuspect classes, the vast majority of people impacted by cross burning are 
racial or religious minorities just as the vast majority of people protected by the 
St. Paul ordinance were members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  Moreover, 
this clear effect was not happenstance in either case.  It cannot be doubted that in 
enacting its cross burning statute, Virginia was aiming at racial intimidation, not 
intimidation of homosexuals or Republicans, just like the City of St. Paul.  This is 
326
 123 S.Ct. at 1549.  Justice Stevens, for one, did not buy this distinction.  He concurred 
separately to reiterate his and Justice White’s view from R.A.V. that a statute singling out cross 
burning should be upheld “even though it does not cover other types of threatening expressive 
conduct.”  Id. at 1553 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
327 Id. (emphasis added).  In an effort to corroborate this conclusion, the Court cited the case of 
Jubilee and tried to cast doubt on the racial motivation behind the cross burning in his yard.  The 
Court’s unwillingness to see the racial discrimination in front of it is perplexing.  It was no mere 
coincidence that Elliott and O’Mara responded to Jubilee’s perceived criticism by burning a cross, 
as opposed to the sundry non-racial forms of venting their anger that were available.  It is telling 
that “Elliott referred to Jubilee with a racial epithet confirming Jubilee’s race.”  Black v. Virginia, 
262 Va. 764, 768 (2001); see also id. (“In addition to the epithet, the record is replete with 
references to Jubilee’s race.”).  Certainly from a victim’s perspective, an African-American who 
awakes to find a cross in her yard is likely to interpret the social meaning of the cross more 
gravely than a white person and experience greater distress (although a white person might be 
quite upset as well).  Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 407 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating 
that certain speech expresses an “overriding message of personal injury and imminent violence . . .  
81
clear from its decision to single out the cross as opposed to other harmful 
symbols, such as the swastika.328  No honest historical account can render the 
burning cross a racially neutral symbol, and Justice O’Connor’s own opinion 
militates against any attempt to do so.329  It is beyond cavil that the central 
organizing principle of the Klan, and its employment of cross burning, is white 
racial supremacy.330  The Klan targets the overwhelming majority of its victims 
because they are viewed as either a direct or indirect threat to the Klan’s racial 
ideology.331  The belief in white purity, intermingled with religious overtones, ties 
together the Klan’s hatred for African-Americans and Jews.  And most other 
victims were either other people of color or whites who allied with African-
Americans or Jews.332  That other groups might be protected was incidental; it 
was not the motivating force behind the Virginia law.  Therefore, instead of 
reifying the principle that protecting only suspect and quasi-suspect classes is 
illegitimate under the First Amendment, the Court should have acknowledged that 
the distinctions in both the Virginia law and the St. Paul ordinance were firmly 
grounded in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.  Yet the Black Court failed to 
a message that it at its ugliest when directed against groups that have been the targets of 
discrimination.”).
328 See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1996).  
329 See, e.g., Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1544 (“Burning a cross in the United States is inextricably 
intertwined with the history of the Ku Klux Klan.”).   
330 See id. at 1543 (stating that the Klan “imposed ‘a veritable reign of terror’” in response to 
“Reconstruction and the corresponding drive to allow freed blacks to participate in the political 
process”); id. at 1546 (“The burning cross became a symbol of the Klan itself and a central feature 
of Klan gatherings.”).  
331 See id. at 1545 (“These cross burnings embodied threats to people whom the Klan deemed 
antithetical to its goals.”).  
332 Cf. id. at 1546 (noting that the Klan attacked “blacks as well as whites whom the Klan viewed 
as sympathetic toward the civil rights movement”); Matsuda, supra, at 2332 (“The same groups, 
using the same techniques, and operating from many of the same motivations and dysfunctions 
typically produce racist and anti-Semitic speech.”).
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acknowledge this.  Although the Court’s recent actions make clear that stare 
decisis does not approach an “inexorable command,”333 apparently in this case, 
respect for recent precedent counseled against an outright repudiation of R.A.V.
A plausible distinction between the laws in R.A.V. and Black is that the 
latter banned only cross burning whereas the St. Paul ordinance was construed to 
reach all fighting words that “arouse[d] anger, alarm or resentment in others on 
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”334  While the St. Paul 
ordinance classified speech on the basis of three categories—race, religion, and 
gender—the Virginia statute homed in on a subset of expression in one or two of 
those categories, race and religion.  Unlike the Justices who concurred in the 
judgment, however, the R.A.V. majority did not train its fire on any overbreadth 
of the ordinance.  To the contrary, in its view, the ordinance was too narrow in 
that it isolated race, gender and religion and excluded all other traits.  
Accordingly, whittling the statute down to the underlying conduct banned in 
R.A.V.—cross burning—would likely not have resolved the problem as it was 
described in the R.A.V. majority opinion.335
333 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003).
334 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379.  
335
 Some may prefer narrow hate speech regulation, perhaps focusing on race, to the broader statute in 
R.A.V.  Akhil Amar has forcefully argued that the Thirteenth Amendment, which bans slavery, would 
justify a hate speech law protecting only African-Americans from terrorizing speech that is tantamount to a 
badge of slavery, see Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 155-58.  Cf. Matsuda, Victim’s Story, 
supra note 11, at 2357-58 (suggesting proposal that would regulate speech only if “directed against a 
historically oppressed group;” hence, “[h]ateful verbal attacks upon dominant-group members by victims is 
permissible”), the current Court would likely view such a law as more problematic than the R.A.V.
ordinance.  Such a statute would not only isolate race as a trait, it would favor some races over others (e.g., 
Africans–Americans would be protected, but not whites), and such a racial classification would have to 
survive strict scrutiny.  See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).  Such an asymmetrical statute would resemble a form of verbal 
affirmative action, and the Court would likely view it with great skepticism.  It would also raise extremely 
difficult questions of classification: Are Latinos and Native Americans, who may suffer contemporary 
discrimination comparable to that experienced by African-Americans, entitled to similar protection even 
though their ancestors were not enslaved?  Can government exclude women, who “like blacks . . . have 
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Despite the Black Court’s ostensible fidelity to R.A.V.’s generality 
principle, in fact it refused to require a ban on burning all symbols, rather than 
singling out the cross.  As the Black Court noted, after its grant of certiorari, 
Virginia “enacted another statute designed to remedy the constitutional problems 
identified by the state court.  See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423.01 (2002).  Section 
18.2-423.01 bans the burning of ‘an object’ when done ‘with the intent of 
intimidating any person or group of persons.”336  As in Eichman, the federal flag 
burning case, the legislature here clearly intended to find another, more 
sophisticated means of accomplishing the same end—prohibiting cross 
burning.337  The Court, however, chose not to take this facially more-neutral 
alternative into account.  Given the existence of the object-burning law, if the 
suffered deeply entrenched and systematic status-based subordination based on physical traits fixed at 
birth?”  Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 160.  Is it constitutional to grant a Black Nationalist 
carte blanche to deride white people with epithets like “cracker” and “honkey,” yet prohibit a white person 
from calling an African-American a “spook” or a “monkey?”  See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 12, at 180 
(arguing that the law should permit a tort action if a white person calls a black man a “boy” but generally 
not if a non-white person called a white person a “honkey”); Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra, at 2361-62 
(same).  Such a law, unlike the evenhanded St. Paul ordinance, would justify the Court’s concerns about 
licensing one side of a debate to “fight freestyle.”  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392.  Drawing on a hypothetical 
analogous statute in the employment law context, would today’s Court uphold a version of Title VII that 
prevented whites from firing African-Americans on the basis of race but left African-American businesses 
and managers free to discriminate against white employees?  The answer, in light of the Court’s history of 
reifing whiteness as something akin to a property interest, see Harris, supra note 58, at 1709, seems clearly 
to be “No.”  Thus, the notion that “openly asymmetrical regulation of racial hate speech may be less, rather 
than more, constitutionally troubling,” Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 160, appears out of 
step with current Equal Protection Clause doctrine. 
In this article, I rely principally on the Fourteenth Amendment because of the fairness concerns 
raised by denying protection to women and gays and lesbians, which would seem to follow from relying 
solely on the Thirteenth Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s text, which is not limited to race, 
offers a more capacious home for hate speech regulation.
336
 123 S.Ct. at 1544 n.1.
337 Cf. Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1560 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that viewpoint based discrimination is 
afoot “when a general prohibition of intimidation is rejected in favor of a distinct proscription of 
intimidation by cross burning”).
The legislature apparently latched onto a statement in the state court decision distinguishing a 
cross-burning law from an object-burning law.  The Virginia Supreme Court stated: “[The legislature] did 
not proscribe the burning of a circle or a square because no animating message is contained in such an act.”  
Black, 262 Va. at 776.
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Court had struck down the cross-burning law, there would have remained a law 
for prosecuting and punishing cross burners.338  Notwithstanding this more 
facially neutral option, Black upheld the cross-burning law.  This decision may 
reflect the Court’s recognition that a more neutral law would not as effectively 
embody the community’s specific opposition to hate crime.  As another opinion 
by Justice O’Connor’s recently confirmed, appearances matter when it comes to 
issues of race.339 Black thus grants government latitude to craft specific 
protections for groups that have historically suffered discrimination without 
extending the laws to cover every other type of fighting word. 
In so doing, Black ultimately validates the power of symbolism and 
withdraws from a strict neutrality requirement regarding racial discrimination.  
The upshot of its holding is that government need not use a blunt instrument—
broad, neutral regulation— such as an “object-burning” law to attack the most 
serious aspects of a problem.  In R.A.V., the Court specifically rejected St. Paul’s 
argument that “a general ‘fighting words’ law would not meet the city’s needs 
because only a content-specific measure can communicate to minority groups that 
the ‘group hatred of such speech ‘is not condoned by the majority.’”340  But 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Black corrects R.A.V.’s erroneous conclusion.341
338 Compare with Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2374 (discussing the “farc[e]” of anti-mask 
legislation, purportedly neutral regulation which has been used to target Ku Klux Klan).
339 See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2341 (“In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the 
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of 
every race and ethnicity.  All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness 
and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training. . . .’”) (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629 (1950)).
340
 505 U.S. at 392 (quoting Brief for Respondent 25).  
341
 In this respect, Matsuda and Lawrence’s prediction that “R.A.V.’s incoherence and illogic are unlikely 
to withstand the test of even a few years time,” Matsuda & Lawrence, supra note 14, at 136, is correct.  
Black was decided little more than a decade after R.A.V.  One year after R.A.V., the Court upheld a 
criminal penalty enhancement for racial bias that it deemed to be aimed at conduct, not speech.  See
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After Black , efforts to ban attacks on groups that have faced the most destructive 
oppression need not be concealed in a bland, beige wrapper in order to elude 
judicial efforts to ferret out content-based discrimination.  Common sense tells us 
that the category of objects (other than the cross) that are typically burned as a 
means of intimidation is rather small, if not entirely empty.  Because the extra 
speech regulated under the “object”-burning law is basically nil, the difference 
between an “object”-burning law and a cross-burning law boils down to a matter 
of form.  Although the government could have regulated cross burning in a more 
neutral manner, Black approved narrower regulation that expressly targeted 
racially harmful expression.342  This new flexibility clears the way for government 
to accomplish a key primary objective in passing hate crime laws: expressing its 
condemnation of the most virulent forms of oppression,343 even though R.A.V.
deemed that governmental viewpoint illegitimate.344
Because intimidating expressive conduct such as cross burning can 
ordinarily be prosecuted under an array of background content-neutral laws,345 a 
chief contribution of more specific hate speech regulation is to express the 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).  Some scholars have understood Mitchell to chip away at 
R.A.V. See Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 18, at 827 (“R.A.V. and Mitchell are very close, 
and the Court did not adequately explain the difference between them.”).  Under this view, Mitchell may be 
a precursor of Black.  
342
 This preference for transparency, while laudable, is in tension with Justice O’Connor’s position in the 
University of Michigan affirmative action decisions, which favors ambiguous policies that covertly 
consider race over those that do so transparently.  See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 2445-46 (2003) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
343 See Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 2374 (“We know why state legislatures . . . have passed 
anti-mask statutes.  It is more honest, and less cynically manipulative of legal doctrine, to legislate openly 
against the worst forms of racist speech, allowing ourselves to know what we know.”).
344 See 505 U.S. at 392 (criticizing St. Paul’s admitted effort to condemn “bias-motivated hatred and . . . 
messages ‘based on virulent notions of racial supremacy”) (quoting 464 N.W.2d at 508, 511)).
345 See, e.g., id. at 380 & n.1 (citing Minnesota laws banning terroristic threats, arson and criminal damage 
to property).
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government’s condemnation of hateful expression.346  Laws that advance equality 
by condemning tools of racial hierarchy—while permitting dissenting expression 
that does not take the form of fighting words—further a constitutional value of the 
highest stature enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment.  Government should not 
have to shroud its commitment to equality in a farce such as the object-burning 
law.
Black is significant not just because of the Court’s bottom-line holding 
and newly flexible approach to the issues, but also because of the line-up of 
Justices in the Black majority.  Justice Scalia, despite writing the majority opinion 
in R.A.V., which appeared to foreclose hate crime regulation, and Justice 
Thomas, both switched sides.  
Indeed, Justice Thomas moved from one end of the spectrum to the other.  
He went so far as to refuse to subject cross burning to any First Amendment 
analysis and to style his opinion a dissent from Justice O’Connor opinion, which 
he viewed as an unnecessary compromise.  Moreover, by many accounts it was 
Justice Thomas’ bold speech347 at oral argument that changed the tenor of the 
346
 In some cases, hate crimes laws may also “relieve prosecutors, or plaintiffs, from having to establish all 
the requisites of a more general offense or tort,” Greenawalt, supra note 137, at 306, or establish greater 
penalties than would apply under other general laws.
347
 The exchange between Justice Thomas and Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben follows:
“QUESTION: Mr. Dreeben, aren’t you understating the--the effects of--of the burning cross? This statute 
was passed in what year?
 MR. DREEBEN: 1952 originally.
 QUESTION: Now, it’s my understanding that we had almost 100 years of lynching and activity in the 
South by the Knights of Camellia and--and the Ku Klux Klan, and this was a reign of terror and the cross 
was a symbol of that reign of terror.  Was--isn’t that significantly greater than intimidation or a threat?
 MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think they’re coextensive, Justice Thomas, because it is--
 QUESTION: Well, my fear is, Mr. Dreeben, that you’re actually understating the symbolism on--of and 
the effect of the cross, the burning cross.  I--I indicated, I think, in the Ohio case that the cross was not a 
religious symbol and that it has--it was intended to have a virulent effect.  And I--I think that what you’re 
attempting to do is to fit this into our jurisprudence rather than stating more clearly what the cross was 
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Justices’ debate.348  Justice Thomas asserted forcefully that in light of the “100 
years of lynching and activity in the South by . . . the Ku Klux Klan” that the sole 
purpose of the cross was “to terrorize a population.”349  Whereas in R.A.V., the 
absence of Justice Marshall—Justice Thomas’ predecessor—was “palpable,”350
and almost certainly dispositive, in Black, Justice Thomas unexpectedly did what 
his predecessor would have done: “remind[] the Justices about the centrality of 
the Reconstruction Amendments.”351
Justice Thomas’ highly unusual and intensely personal decision to bring to 
bear his own experiences with racism vindicates critical race theory’s advocacy of 
the importance of looking to individual experience and considering the victim’s 
story.  Justice Thomas opened his opinion with the words: “In every culture, 
certain things acquire meaning beyond what outsiders can comprehend.”352  In 
this sense, the Pin Point, Georgia native was an insider, and the other eight 
intended to accomplish and, indeed, that it is unlike any symbol in our society.
 MR. DREEBEN: Well, I don’t mean to understate it, and I entirely agree with Your Honor’s description of 
how the cross has been used as an instrument of intimidation against minorities in this country.  That has 
justified 14 States in treating it as a distinctive--
 QUESTION: Well, it’s--it’s actually more than minorities.  There’s certain groups.
 And I--I just--my fear is that the--there was no other purpose to the cross.  There was no communication of 
a particular message.  It was intended to cause fear--
 MR. DREEBEN: It--
 QUESTION: --and to terrorize a population.”  2002 WL 31838589, at *22-24.
348 See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 188, at A1 (“During the brief minute or two that Justice Thomas 
spoke, about halfway through the hourlong argument session, the other justices gave him rapt attention.  
Afterward, the court’s mood appeared to have changed.  While the justices had earlier appeared somewhat 
doubtful of the Virginia statute’s constitutionality, they now seemed quite convinced that they would 
uphold it as consistent with the First Amendment.”); Clarence Page, A Burning Cross Ignites An Issue of 
Free Speech, NEWSDAY, Dec. 17, 2002, at A36.  
349
 2002 WL 31838589.
350
 Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 160.
351 Id. at 161.  “[J]ustice Marshall would no doubt have insisted [that] these lessons must be pondered by 
the Justices, and communicated to the people.”  Id.
352 Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1562 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Justices were outsiders—only Justice Thomas, the Court’s sole African-American 
and sole Southerner, was intimately familiar with the legacy of racial oppression 
underlying Virginia’s cross burning statute.353  After years of sitting silently on 
the sidelines during oral argument and seeming generally disinterested, Justice 
Thomas finally learned to assert himself.354 Infusing the argument with historical 
implications, he transformed a dry legal discussion, purportedly detached from 
individual experience, into a visceral debate about speech and equality.  
At the same time, Justice Thomas’ excessive fixation on the virulence of 
the Klan cross ultimately led him astray.  In concluding that the ban on cross 
burning did not even raise a First Amendment issue, he inexplicably dismissed 
uses of the Klan cross that are not intended to intimidate, such as those done in 
the presence of only Klan members.   Justice Thomas’ distaste for cross burning 
and its ugly history—although entirely understandable—appears to have obscured 
his ability to see the legitimate speech issue lurking beneath the putrid practice.  
Although in R.A.V. he had joined an opinion reaching out to create a First 
Amendment problem where previous Courts had intimated there was none,355 in 
Black, he opted to jettison First Amendment analysis altogether.  The symbolic, 
constitutionally-protected burning cross at issue in R.A.V. over time somehow 
353 See Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 312-13 (discussing the importance of judicial consideration of 
experiences that are foreign to the particular judge); see also Matsuda, Victim’s Story, supra note 11, at 
2374 (“Legal insiders cannot imagine a life disabled in a significant way by hate propaganda.”).  
354
 Although Justice Thomas has gradually developed a distinct viewpoint through opinions written in the 
last few years, see, e.g., Scott D. Gerber, The Strong, Silent Supreme Type, L.A.TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, at 
M5, the Black opinion appears to be a turning point.  Not long after Black, he issued a dissent that was 
even more impassioned and highly personal, if more wrongheaded.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. at 
2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
355 Cf. Amar, Missing Amendments, supra note 138, at 127 (noting R.A.V.’s “ambitious reconceptualization 
and synthesis of First Amendment doctrine”); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 104 (“[D]idn’t Justice Scalia reach 
out unnecessarily in R.A.V. to condemn the government’s motives . . .?”); see also Powell, supra note 3, at 
81 (discussing the “extreme lengths” to which the R.A.V. Court went to privilege free speech).
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became pure conduct to Justice Thomas.  This transformation in perspective is 
difficult to explain.  Justice Thomas’ experiences with racial discrimination in the 
South obviously predated R.A.V.  If anything, after more than a decade of living 
the relatively sequestered life of a Supreme Court Justice, he should have been 
more insulated from virulent racial bigotry than he was when R.A.V. was decided 
and he had recently and barely survived the “high tech lynching” of his 
confirmation hearing.  In the absence of any concrete recent experience newly 
sensitizing Justice Thomas to the seriousness of cross burning, Black appears to 
demonstrate an increased willingness on his part to express a voice that reflects 
his distinctive racial experiences, even when that requires parting company with 
his conservative brethren.  Although Justice Thomas’ thoughts on cross burning 
presumably are not new, only recently has he become emboldened to speak his 
views and wield them to shape not just his own opinion but also the outcome of a 
case.356
This emergence is highly valuable, although it does present potential 
perils.357  Some may criticize it as tending to foster a perception that social groups 
can obtain justice only when they are able to seat a member on the Highest 
Court,358 but Justice Thomas’ idiosyncratic perspective is far too complex and 
confounding to be essentialized as a “black voice” or “black vote.”  The true 
lesson of Justice Thomas’ emergence is that it instructs the other Justices to think 
twice about residing within their own personal experiences and assumptions, 
356 See Greenhouse, supra note 188, at A1.
357 See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Personal Truths and Legal Fictions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002 (suggesting 
that Justice Thomas might have “hijack[ed] the argument into the murk of personal experience . . . [and] 
d[one] violence to the disinterested, lucid distance necessary for justice to be achieved”).
358 See id. at A35; cf. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 313.
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which often go unstated but surely color their opinions nonetheless.  Considering 
and expressing one’s personal experiences, as Justice Thomas did in Black, does 
not inexorably lead that Justice or others to a particular conclusion.  Nor is it, 
contrary to some scholars’ suggestion,359 a racial trump card or gender veto.  
Rather, considering the experience of those who have actually felt discrimination 
requires only serious and empathetic consideration of such persons’ experiences 
and perspectives.  
Although those who have experienced life on the bottom should speak 
their minds, their peers should critically evaluate such opinions.  This testing 
sometimes may lead the speaker, as well as his peers, ultimately to abandon his 
articulated opinion.360  One must be vigilant to ensure that in reflecting on his 
own personal experiences he is not blinded by them.361  A judge might rule 
contrary to his initial impression and the apparent interests of his group because 
of ultimate, overriding principles that transcend his individualistic experience.  By 
stripping away the deceptive veneer of detached neutrality that veils the personal 
value judgments behind many judicial opinions, the proportionate approach leads 
to a fuller, more concrete and deliberative process that is appropriately self-
conscious.    
359
 Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 308-09 & n.201 (discussing Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group 
Difference, 99 ETHICS, 250, 261-62 (1989)); Torrey, supra note 11, at 34 (arguing that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “should carry more weight than earlier amendments which, after all, were written by a few 
elite, white propertied, heterosexual males”). 
360 See Emerson, supra note 264, at 881 (“[A]n individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all 
sides of the question, especially as presented by those who feel strongly and argue militantly for a different 
view.  He must consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition, make full use of 
different minds to sift the true from the false.”).
361 Cf. Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias, supra note 97, at 525-26 (discussing the panoptic effect of racism, 
which can lead a rational person of color to overestimate the prevalence of discrimination).
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This discursive process also entails an intriguing element of trust.  As 
Robert Post has observed, the force of victims’ experiences “cannot be directly 
experienced and hence evaluated by members of dominant groups.  Its resolution 
must therefore depend, to one degree or another, upon acceptance of the 
representations of members of victim groups.  As a practical matter, therefore, 
what is called into question is not merely the truth of these representations, but 
also the trust and respect with which they are received by members of dominant 
groups.”362  Thus, the salience of the experiences of people on the bottom turns in 
part on the credibility of the person articulating outsider experiences.  In Black, 
the fact that the speaker was not the NAACP or some critical race scholar writing 
an amicus brief, but the stolidly conservative Clarence Thomas must have carried 
greater weight in his fellow Justices’ eyes.  The fact that Justice Thomas speaks 
very rarely in court, apparently choosing his opportunities with great care, only 
heightened the drama and the persuasive impact of his speech.  In the same way, 
the words of a law clerk that is a member of an outgroup might carry considerable 
weight because they are spoken in the context of a potentially close and enduring 
personal relationship.363  Incorporating an approach that looks to personal 
experiences, if understood as just one component of constitutional analysis, 
carries the promise of grounding the Justices’ lofty legal analysis in practical 
reality, making the Court’s decisions both more democratic and comprehensible 
to the public.
362
 Post, Racist Speech, supra note 4, at 312-13; see also Lawrence, supra note 4, at 435 (discussing the 
“double consciousness” of African-Americans: “We often hear racist speech when our white neighbors are 
not aware of its presence.”).
363 Cf. Yoshino, Suspect Symbols, supra note 145, at 1753-55 (recounting conversation between a gay law 
clerk applicant and a judge that had recently decided a major gay rights case but did not know the meaning 
of the term “queer”).
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V. Conclusion
Unlike an approach that consistently privileges speech or equality, under 
the proportionate approach, the “appropriate balance between equality and 
freedom of expression may be a complex, shifting matrix that includes several 
different forces . . . .”364  Although a self-contained model for resolving speech-
equality conflicts would be desirable, it would also necessarily be facile and 
anachronistic in constitutional jurisprudence.  What we can learn, however, is the 
importance of resisting the temptation to privilege one constitutional provision 
over another.  A holistic approach to the Constitution that invests the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments with equal dignity requires otherwise.  In many cases, a 
close look at each asserted interest, examined against the social history and 
context of the claim, would reveal that one side of the equation is less substantial.  
The hard cases remain, but I have attempted to show that R.A.V. and Black, when 
analyzed with the proportionate approach, do not reside within the small set of 
truly hard cases.  
The Boy Scouts case is more difficult, in part because of factual questions 
the Court chose not to explore.  Even if one agrees with the result, an opinion that 
recognized the equality considerations at work elsewhere in the Court’s case law 
and that reflected the actual experiences of people like James Dale would be more 
legitimate and deserving of respect than the terse analysis offered by the Boy 
Scouts majority.  Paying close attention to context and history, listening to the 
experiences of the individual parties and respecting the important role that state 
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equality-based laws may play in our system can help correct the Court’s lopsided 
approach to equality-speech intersections.  
364
 Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate-Speech 
Restriction, 78 IOWA L. REV. 737, 749 (1993).
